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A Programming Approach to Public School Financing in New York
by
James Colburn and Richard N . Boisvert*
Introduction
Based on data from the National Education Association (1979), some 
would argue that the 1978-79 school year is particularly significant in 
the history of school finance. Total revenues received by primary and 
secondary schools nationally were estimated at $86.8 billion but for the 
first time, revenues from state sources exceeded those raised directly by 
local school districts. State aid was estimated to be 47% of total reve­
nues. The local share was approximately 44% with the balance coming from 
Federal sources. This situation reflects a continual trend that began at 
least 50 years ago. In 1929-30, for example, state revenues accounted 
for only 17% of the total and the local school districts1 share was 83%. 
Throughout much of the 20th Century, state governments have assumed an 
increasingly larger role in educational finance.
During most of this period, New York State’s system of public school 
finance has followed national trends. In 1929-30, 27% of public school 
revenues came from the State. This percentage reached a maximum of 45% 
in 1969-70. Since then, the State’s share has fallen to approximately 
40% (University of the State of New York, various years).
Despite its continued growth nationally, state aid has always been 
the subject of controversy. The controversy now centers around the grow­
ing financial crises in local governments and the ability of states, 
through equalization aid, to compensate for disparities in wealth among 
school districts, and thus, to help guarantee equal educational opportu­
nity to its citizens. During the early 1970’s, plaintiffs in numerous 
court cases charged that existing systems of school finance (based on 
local property taxes and existing state aid formulas) still denied equal 
educational opportunity to students in "poorer" districts (Stubblebine 
and Teeples, 1974, Clune, 1972 and Michelson, 1972).
New York undertook an extensive examination of the quality, cost, 
and financing of education in 1969. The Fleischmann Commission's (1972) 
basic conclusion was that the State should be responsible for the full 
funding of education in order to insure that spending was at adequate 
levels and that any disparities in spending would reflect only the spe­
cial educational needs of districts when costs were excessive or there 
were students with learning difficulties.
*James Colburn is an economist with the World Food Board, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. and Richard N. Boisvert is a Professor, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University.
2In addition to their expenditure recommendations, the Commis­
sion proposed changes in school taxation as a partial solution 
to the inequities said to be inherent in the local property 
tax. A statewide property tax levied at a uniform rate of 
$20.40 per $1,000 of full value would initially replace exist­
ing local property tax revenues. Then reliance on the state­
wide property tax would be eliminated over a five-year period, 
with replacement revenues being derived from the progressive 
State income tax (Boisvert and Mapp, 1974, p. 584).
Because of the drastic nature of the Commission's recommendations, the 
Governor and the New York State Legislature chose not to implement many 
of the suggested modifications. Instead, the decade of the 1970’s was 
marked by incremental changes in the existing state aid formulas.
In 1976, New York's system of school finance came under Constitu­
tional challenge (Board of Education, 1978). The initial decision, in 
favor of the plaintiffs, was recently overturned under appeal, but there 
is still likely to be increased attention focused on the State's system 
of school finance for years to come.
The purpose of this study is to examine the inequities in the cur­
rent public school financing arrangements in New York State and determine 
the impact of modifications in the state aid formulas needed to alleviate 
them. Because of the political constraints involved in major structural 
changes in the way schools are financed, it is advisable to begin by 
examining the existing aid system, placing a major emphasis on taxpayer 
equity. Only if it cannot be modified to meet the current objections and 
withstand future Constitutional challenge should attention be given to a 
completely different system such as the ones proposed by the Fleischmann 
Commission and the Special Task Force on Equity and Education in 1980.
The emphasis is placed on examining the aid situation for the 1980- 
81 school year, the most recent year for which data were available. 
Because many of the inequities still exist and the aid formulas have not 
changed dramatically, the methodology and the results remain generally 
applicable. The background into the history of school finance in section 
two may help place the problem into proper perspective. The third sec­
tion outlines state aid formulas used by New York State during the 
1970’s. The fourth section examines various strategies for evaluating 
state aid formulas and contains a specification of the programming model 
used in this research. The empirical results follow in the fifth section 
and the report concludes with a section on policy implications.
Background
By the turn of the Century, economic growth accompanying the Indus­
trial Revolution had begun to cause wide disparities in the wealth of 
individual school districts and other units of local government. Argu­
ments for creating a system of state "equalization” aid began to emerge,
3primarily from the standpoint of assisting local governments finance an 
acceptable level of education.1
Despite these disparities, the desire to maintain local control over 
the public school system remained the overriding consideration in financ­
ing decisions. It was argued that schools should be administered at the 
local level because increased state funding would lead eventually to 
homogeneous school systems under state control and would stifle many edu­
cational innovations.
Rapid industrialization during World War I exacerbated the dispari­
ties in school district wealth. The advances in transportation and other 
technological innovations led to a more mobile society; rural areas were 
no longer completely isolated from urban areas. These changes increased 
the demand for education throughout the country. Although total revenues 
collected by public schools more than doubled between the 1919-20 and 
1929-30 school years, the states' shares remained less than 20% of the 
total (NEA, 1979).
During the Depression, school districts had little choice but to 
rely more heavily on state resources. Property values were eroding along 
with incomes and many people were unable to pay their property taxes. 
Therefore, in spite of continued reluctance to increase their dependence 
on higher levels of government, school districts were obtaining just over 
30% of their revenues from state sources by the 1939-40 school year.
World War II also had a significant impact on public education, its 
finance and state involvement. Perhaps the most pronounced impact was 
due to the post-war baby boom which started in the mid-1940's and contin­
ued well into the 1950's. Additional pressures were placed on school 
systems because education enabled individuals to share in the benefits of 
the technological advance and was viewed by many as security for one's 
children against future economic disasters (Garms et al., 1978).
These factors culminated in tremendous increases in primary and 
secondary school enrollments. Between 1940 and 1955, the number of 
children enrolled in public schools increased by 23%, from 25.4 million 
to 31.2 million (Academic Media, 1969). The same factors explained the 
increased expenditures on primary and secondary education throughout the 
1960's. The revenues per pupil received by school districts from all 
sources increased from $300 to $759 in constant 1967 dollars representing
^Cubberly (1905) was one of the first to note the direct relation­
ship between quality of school programs and local fiscal capacity. He 
argued that districts with property wealth had more resources to allocate 
to schools and recommended that districts with less fiscal capacity 
should be given more aid than richer districts.
4a 359% increase in real revenues (Colburn, 1981).  ^ Pupil-teacher ratios 
decreased significantly, from 28 to 21 (National Center for Education, 
Statistics, 1976). Although few would argue that pupil-teacher ratios 
are perfectly correlated with; quality of education,* the tremendous in­
crease in revenues (expenditures) during this period and the decrease in 
pupil-teacher ratios can be explained in large part by the public's 
desire to increase educational quality.
As stated above, arguments for equalization aid to the poorer school 
districts were put forward as early as 1905. It was believed that the 
poorer districts, already burdened with property taxes, should be aided 
by the state. In addition, the more recent recognition that education 
results in substantial "spillover" benefits implies that without state 
aid, local governments, when viewed from society's point of view, would 
underinvest in education.^
Despite these long term trends in state aid, school expenditures 
even now depend tremendously on the "wealth" of the districts them­
selves . While one objective of state aid is to facilitate some minimum 
level of expenditure, many state aid formulas still are tied to local tax 
efforts. Until 1970, little attention was given to equalizing expendi­
tures across the various districts even within a state.
' At this time, there is still a concern on the part of local educa­
tors that too much state aid will erode local control. However, few edu­
cators would deny the fact that state aid has become an indispensible 
part of educational finance. They see it as a way to quiet the critics 
of the property tax, but according to other criticsj, rising state aid has 
neither led to equal spending nor to equal educational opportunity.
9‘■Much of the data available on school district finance is in terms 
of revenue. However, there is such a high correlation between revenues 
and expenditures that little distinction between the two is made in gen­
eral discussion. For example, in 1979, the correlation coefficient for 
total current expenditures and total revenues in the 50 states was 
0.9975.
^For example, Hanushek (1971) implies that classroom composition may 
be more important than class size. The more time a teacher must spend on 
discipline, the less effective the teacher will be in educating students, 
regardless of the pupil - teacher ratios.
^Spillovers occur when "collective choices" made by local governing 
units concerning the allocation of resources.. . "have effects that 1spill 
over1 to residents in other communities who do not participate in the 
collective decisions." [In education,]... "there tends to be spillout, 
because some of the recipients of education relocate to other areas after 
they finish their schooling" (Hyman, 1968, p. 291-2).
5The first major victory for critics of traditional school financing 
systems came in 1971 when the California Supreme Court declared the 
state's method of financing elementary and secondary schools in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Consti­
tution (Serrano v. Priest, 1971). The Court's conclusion was that school 
financing based primarily upon property taxes discriminates against the 
poor, making education a function of a school district's wealth. Other 
landmark cases followed, but 1973 marked a serious setback for school 
finance reformers. The plaintiffs in San Antonio Independent School Pis- 
trict et al. v. Rodriguez et al» (1973) also challenged the Equal Protec­
tion 'Clause of the 14th Amendment, but the courts eventually concluded 
that the Texas school finance system was not in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. According to this decision, education is not a right guar­
anteed by the U.S. Constitution.
As an alternative strategy, critics turned their attention away from 
the U.S. Constitution and focused the attack on individual state consti­
tutions. To date, 16 traditional school finance systems have failed to 
withstand state constitutional challenge• In 13 other states, chal­
lenges had been initiated as of 1978.^
In the wake of these court decisions, states must find new ways to 
finance education in the future. Reform may come through total state 
control of resources or major changes in existing state aid formulas to 
remove the disparities.
Issues in New York State School Finance
Compared with other states, New York has for many years been among 
the leaders in spending for primary and secondary education. In the
1978-79 school year, for example, an average of approximately $2,760 was 
spent per pupil (e.g., measured as average weighted daily attendance); 
only Alaska and the District of Columbia had higher spending levels. New
5Since 1971, 16 states have substantially revised their school fi­
nance systems: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin (NEA, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1979). 
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Wisconsin and Colorado changed to a state 
guaranteed taxbase type aid formula. Also called district power equali­
zation, aid is determined only according to the tax rate; wealth is neu­
tralized across districts by the state. Maine, Montana and Connecticut 
modified state aid by using district power equalization in addition to 
already existing aid formulas. California raised the guaranteed level of 
support. (See Brown, Ginsburg et al., 1978.)
^These states are: Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, New 
York, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin (Brown, Ginsburg, et al., 1978).
6York's spending per pupil was 45% above the national average of $1,909.  ^
Revenues to finance these expenditures- were estimated at $8 billion, 
nearly 60% of which was raised through local taxation of real property 
(NEA, 1980).
Although average expenditures per pupil for public primary and sec­
ondary education are high, the tremendous variability in per pupil spend­
ing among New York's 700+ school districts finally precipitated legal 
action by some districts challenging New York’s method of financing ele­
mentary and secondary education. The plaintiffs found two causes for 
action. The first alleged a violation of the Equal Protection clause of 
the State Constitution (Art. 1, Sect. 11):
■.. the original plaintiffs assert in their first cause of 
action that the State’s method of financing public education 
[including the substantial state aid allocations] 'denies to 
plaintiff students and their parents those educational re­
sources available to students in other, wealthier districts in 
the State.' Further, that such system prevents the plaintiff 
districts from carrying out their full responsibilities and 
obligations to the schools, parents and children and compels 
them to offer an education inferior to that offered by other 
districts possessing greater real property wealth (Levittown 
v. Nyquist, 1978, p. 4).
In the second cause, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Education 
Article of the State Constitution (Art. XI, Sec. 1):
... by making the extent to which a child may be educated a 
function of the real property wealth of the school district in 
which that child happens to reside, or the school district in 
which that child’s parents are able to afford to live, the 
State has violated the democratic and egalitarian intention 
that underlies the Education Article, substituting in its stead 
an imperraissable reliance on the accident of real property 
wealth as the ultimate determinant of the quality of education 
available to the children in any particular part of the State 
(Levittown V. Nyquist, 1978, p . 6).
A judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in favor of the 
plaintiffs was issued on June 23, 1978. An appeal was entered on Janu­
ary 2, 1979 and was still pending when this research began. During the 
summer of 1982, the appeal was decided in the State's favor. Despite 
this outcome one must still be concerned with questions of educational
7Expenditures include current expenditures (administration, instruc­
tional services, plant operation and maintenance, fixed charges and other 
school services and programs), capital outlay (expenditures for site and 
site improvements, new buildings and renovations of existing structures, 
furniture, equipment and publicly-oWned vehicles) and interest expendi­
tures. Sources of revenues to finance these expenditures include local 
property taxes and state and Federal aid.
7quality and opportunity among school districts throughout the State. 
Even if one assumes that future court challenges are successful, it is 
doubtful that the courts would articulate a specific system for school 
finance. At best, the State Legislature would be given only general 
guidelines as to what is acceptable from a constitutional point of view.
It is the proper function and duty of the judicial branch of 
government to render a judgment declaring whether a statutory 
plan is in compliance with constitutional requirements. It is 
equally the proper function and duty of the legislative branch 
to devise a state educational finance system that is constitu­
tional. That is the command of the Education Article of the New 
York Constitution (Article XI, Sec. 1)... this Court has deemed 
it necessary to refrain from expressing an opinion as to the 
appropriateness of any particular means or technique for at­
taining a suitable school finance system in this state believ­
ing that ' the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers 
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them' (San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at p.
59) (Levittown v. Nyquist, 1978, pp. 103-4)•
Regardless of how changes are initiated, there is unlikely to be 
widespread agreement on what constitutes equal educational opportunity. 
Developing a suitable criterion for assessing educational opportunity is 
complicated by a number of factors. The major difficulty is that society 
lacks any adequate measure of educational output. Proxies for educa 
tional output such as the number of students educated, expenditures per 
student or the average scores on standardized tests have been used exten 
sively, but the problems associated with their use in this regard are 
well-known.
The validity of performances on standardized tests as a proxy for 
measuring educational output has been questioned (Cohn and Miliman, 
1975). Test scores measure cognitive skills but do not include a measure 
of attitudes, values or character, which are considered important in 
assessing a pupil’s education. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
these tests may discriminate against certain ethnic or minority groups. 
Despite these limitations, test scores are considered by many to be the 
best available measure of output and hence, are used widely.
School inputs and non—school inputs are also used extensively to 
explain educational output. School inputs include teacher experience, 
teacher education, class size, and other human and physical inputs. 
Problems arise in distinguishing the nature of these purchased re­
sources because effectiveness and productivity of the various inputs are 
not easily determined (Hanushek, 1971). Non-school inputs are reflected 
in the socio-economic background of the students, including race, sex,
®Studies using non—school as well as school inputs to explain 
achievement include those by: Kiesling (1967), Tuckman (1971), Garms and 
Smith (1970) and Cohn and Miliman (1975).
8family size, and family income. These environmental factors do not dis­
tinguish ability among students.
In order to equalize educational opportunity, school and non-school 
inputs must be considered. The mixture of school inputs among districts 
may vary significantly and the effectiveness and productivity of re­
sources, viewed differently by administrators, may cause some districts 
to intensify the use of an input relative to others. For example, to 
compensate for the lack of non-school inputs, a student from a poor fami­
ly, living in overcrowded conditions, may require more of a teacher's 
time to reach the same level of achievement as a student from a higher 
income group.^  School districts with many disadvantaged or handicapped 
pupils may need more school inputs to reach the same level of educational 
output as other districts.
Efforts to equalize educational opportunity by equalizing expendi­
tures are confounded by these problems• Differential expenditures are 
Justified for districts containing pupils with varying needs. Uncertain­
ty of the productivity of inputs may cause administrators to use differ­
ent resource mixes and costs of purchased resources vary from district to 
district. Therefore, expenditures and educational opportunity are not 
synonymous, but expenditures are the lowest common denominator over which 
governments have control and their equalization is usually viewed as a 
move toward equalizing educational opportunity. The Fleischmann Commis­
sion concluded that ..while equality of expenditure In accordance with 
some reasonable education standard may not inevitably result in higher 
quality education, we feel that such equality Is the essential first step 
toward achieving that goal'* (p. 24). The Commission viewed equal educa­
tional opportunity as access to enough resources to Insure a certain 
level of achievement.
Directly related to equalizing expenditures is equalized tax ef­
fort . Even after accounting for state aid, some local districts may need 
an excessively large property tax rate In order to spend as much as 
richer districts. In other districts, the costs of providing other pub­
lic services such as fire and police protection may also be extremely 
high and place an additional burden on property tax revenues.!! Thus,
^Monk (1980) discusses "student efficiency" which describes the mar­
ginal products of different students. High levels of student efficiency 
are associated with high marginal products. Other inputs combined with 
students having a high level of efficiency produce a greater output than 
when combined with students with lower levels of efficiency.
l^Using regression analysis, Garms and Smith (1970) found that 75% 
of the variation in student achievement could be explained by six socio­
economic variables: ethnic background, broken homes, welfare, over­
crowded housing, student mobility, and parents' education.
1 -^ This Is the municipal overburden argument brought forth in Levit- 
town v. Nyquist, pp. 43-51.
9simultaneous, equalization of tax effort and expenditures may not be fea­
sible given revenues currently budgeted to state aid.
State Aid to Education in New York
The purpose of this section is to describe New York's system of 
state aid to education and the major changes that have been made in state 
aid apportionment throughout the 1970's. While some of these changes 
have evolved from the Fleischmann Commission's recommendations or may be 
in response to the inequity charges in Levittown v. Nyquist, the finan­
cial pressures in all local governments and other state and local politi­
cal considerations are also partly responsible.
Although state aid increased dramatically in New York State during 
the early 1900's, state aid has contributed between 35% and 45% of total 
educational expenditures between 1950 and 1978. Despite increased con­
cern over equality of educational opportunity and changes in the aid for­
mulas in response to these concerns, there has been no clear trend toward 
an increase in aid as a proportion of total expenditures (table 1). This 
is contrary to what one would expect if the formula changes were indeed 
designed to provide more resources to poorer districts, without penaliz­
ing the richer ones.
More importantly, detailed information by school district suggests 
that disparities have existed throughout the period. For example, school 
districts in Yates County expended an average of $1,126 per pupil in 
Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA) in 1970-71 whereas expenditures 
in Westchester County averaged $1,829 per pupil in WADA in the same year 
(The University of the State of New York, 1970—71)• School districts in 
these same two counties in the 1977-78 school year spent an average of 
$1,986 and $3,375 per pupil in WADA, respectively. In percentage terms, 
Westchester County was spending an average 62% more per pupil in 1970-71 
than was Yates County. In 1977-78, the differences increased to 69%. 
While one might argue that some of these disparities are justified in 
terms of differences in costs of educational services between a rural and 
an urban county, such a large disparity is not justified- These dis­
parities have also been documented by witnesses in Levittown v. Nyquist, 
1978. One witness, for example, Indicated that the range in expenditures 
per pupil across all school districts in New York in 1974 was from $936 
to $4,215. The property wealth per pupil across all districts ranged 
from $8,884 to $412,370.
To identify changes in the state aid formula that could eliminate 
these disparities, one must first develop a working knowledge of the com­
position of state aid, the existing aid formulas and how these differ
12According to Wendling (1979), there are considerable differences 
in the costs of certain educational resources throughout the State. The 
index for the cost of educational resources (1977-78) in Westchester 
County's school districts ranged from 1.03 to 1.13. In Yates County, 
this range was from 0.92 to 0.94. Thus, it appears that these spending 
differences between districts in these two counties are due to more than 
just the differential costs of educational inputs.
10
Table 1- Expenditures and State Aid From All Sources for Elementary and 
Secondary Public Schools, New York State
School
Year
Total
Expenditures
State
Aid
Aid as Percent 
of Expenditures
- - - - million $ - - - - - - - % - - -
1977-78 $8,229a $3,165a 39
1976-77 7,926 3,094 39
1975-76 7,621 3,071 40
1974-75 7,395 2,931 40
1973-74 6,672 2,551 38
1972-73 5,969 2,440 41
1971-72 5,571 2,374 43
1970-71 5,254 2,325 44
1965-66 2,799 1,272 45
1960-61 1,750 748 43
1955-56 1,031 374 36
1950-51 616 250 41
1945-46 378 121 32
Sources: The University of the State of New York, n.d.; 1976.
a Estimated.
from those in effect at the beginning of the 1970's. Table 2 contains a 
list of different types of aid and their relative importance. Throughout 
the 1970's, operating aid has constituted over 70% of all school aid. 
While the other kinds of aid can be extremely important to individual 
districts, operating expense aid is the largest component and is most 
directly associated with educational inputs. Therefore, the discussion 
is directed toward operating aid.
1970-71 Operating Aid Formula
Operating expense aid from the state to local school districts in 
1970-71 was distributed with the help of an aid ratio, which depended on 
the property wealth of a school district relative to the state average 
property wealth. The total amount of aid depended on the expenditure 
level of the school district and some measure of student numbers.
The aid ratio for any school district in 1970-71 was calculated by 
the following:
11
Table 2. Components of General State to Major School Districts in New 
York
ior--CTi 71 1976-77 1978-79E
Components Amount
(millions)
% of 
Total
Amount
(millions)
% of 
Total
Amount
(millions)
% of 
Total
Operating Aida $1,810 77 $2,310 75 $2,505 74
Building Aid 194 8 209 7 212 6
Transportation
Aid 129 6 258 8 296 9
Other Aid 211 9 301 10 353 11
Total Aid $2,344 100 $3,078 100 $3,366 100
Sources: The University of the State of New York (1970, 1978).
E - estimated.
a For 1970-71, this includes operating expense aid, growth and size cor­
rection aid and current budget aid. Operating expense aid is 70 percent 
of total aid in this year. It is assumed that the figures for 1976-77 
and 1978-79 are only operating expense aid, but the description of what 
is included in operating aid in the sources from which the data were de­
rived is unclear on this point.
(1) ARlt = (1 -
PV1(t-2)/RHADA1(t-2)
AFVRWADA
where
t = current year in which aid is paid;
FVi = full market value of taxable property in school district i;
RWADA^ = resident weighted average daily attendance, calculated by 
subtracting the weighted average daily attendance (WADA) of 
non-resident pupils attending public school in the district 
- from the district’s WADA and adding the WADA of pupils 
resident in the district but attending full time a school 
operated by a Board of Cooperative Education Services 
(BOCES) or a County Vocational Education and Extension 
Board (CVEEB). WADA is determined by weighting average 
daily attendance (ADA): half—day, kindergarten, 0.5; full
day kindergarten and grades one through six, 1.00; grades 
seven through twelve, 1.25. Average daily attendance is 
the aggregate number of attendance days of pupils in a 
school district divided by the number of days in session.
12
AFVRWADA = statewide average full value of taxable property in (t-2) 
per resident weighted average daily attendance (The Univer­
sity of the State of New York, 1976).
The aid ratio determines the state’s share of a district's approved 
operating expenses (AOE) or a ceiling level, whichever is lower. Ap­
proved operating expenses on which aid was apportioned in 1970-71 were 
the day-to-day expenditures (AOE ) in district i in year t-1, the
base year. In 1970-71, the state ceiling level was $860. Thus, for some 
districts, the state would share in expenses of up to $860 per WADA. A 
district’s operating aid could be calculated by the formula:
(2) (AID)it - ARlt (WADAit)(A0Ei,t_1); for A0Ei,t_1 < 860
« ARlt[WADAlt] [860] ; for A O E ^ ^  >_ 860.
The formula was constructed so that the state's share was 49% of AOE 
or the ceiling level for a district of average wealth. As a district’s 
wealth increased, the State's share decreased. However, all districts 
were guaranteed at least $310 per WADA.^ ^ This was the "flat grant"
provision of the 1970-71 aid formula. Districts receiving $310 per WADA 
were called "flat grant" districts. "Equalization" districts are those 
which received less aid as property wealth increased. No district could 
receive more than 90% of its expenditures in state aid.^
Three important observations can be made about this aid formula. 
First, the aid ratio depends on the relative property wealth in a dis­
trict . If some other measure of wealth, such as income were used, the 
distribution of aid could be altered substantially. Second, because a 
measure of student numbers other than a head count on enrollment is used 
in the aid calculation, it is also possible to alter the distribution of 
aid by a legislative change in this measure of student numbers. Finally, 
without changing the basic formula, aid allocations could be altered sig­
nificantly by changing the 0.51 figure in equation (1) so that contribu­
tion by the state in the form of aid going to a district of average prop­
erty wealth would be different from 49%. A careful examination of the
^WADA-£t was used in calculating total aid (equation (2)) because 
this reflects the weighted number of students attending school in the 
year to which the aid applies. RWADA^^ ^  was used to calculate the aid
ratio so that wealth per pupil is based on the number of students resid­
ing in the district, not on the number attending school in that district.
l^This was accomplished by placing a ceiling of 0.9 on the aid ratio 
even for very poor districts. Since A F V R W A D A ^  - $32,300, the aid
ratio would reach 0.9 for a full value of property per RWADA of $6,333 in
1968-69.
13
proposals for changing the aid formulas during the decade of the 1970 s 
indicates that much of the attention has been focused on the first two 
items.
The 1970-71 aid formulas were in effect during the time the Fleisch- 
mann Commission was studying school finance in New York. Their recommen­
dations reflect a recognition of the importance of the measure of wealth 
and number of students in the distribution of aid.
Although one purpose of state aid has always been to assist the 
poorer school districts and districts making substantial local effort to 
finance education, the Fleischmann Commission (1971) concluded that the 
aid system in 1968-69, which was essentially the same as the one for 
1970-71 described above, did little to equalize educational opportunity 
across school districts. Table 3 contains data from New York State 
school districts on expenditure per student and average full value prop­
erty, ranked by quartiles. The relationship shows that spending in the
1 9 6 9 - 7 0 school year was directly related to property wealth, and as indi­
cated above, the Commission made a number of recommendations to correct 
the situation.
Table 3. Operating Expenditures and Property 
District Quartiles, New York State
Valuation 1969-70 by School
Quartile Expenditure 
per Student3
Average Full Value 
Property per Student
1 $1,330 $39,836
2 1,041 27,703
3 932 22,389
4 856 17,545
Source: The Fleischmann Commission (1971)
a Although it is not clear from the Fleischmann Commission's discussion, 
students in this context probably refer to students in weighted average 
daily attendance.
1974-75 Operating Aid Formula
In 1974, legislation was enacted to incorporate some of the Fleisch­
mann Commission's recommendations particularly those relating to special 
needs of students with learning difficulties. Under such a scheme, the 
state in theory guarantees equal spending per pupil for equal local ef 
fort. The new aid formula was a foundation program in which the state 
set a minimum expenditure level supported by a combination of state and 
local funds. Consequently, aid ratios used to determine state shares 
were eliminated. Expenditure ceilings were raised to $1,200 per pupil 
and the WADA measure was modified with new weightings. Total aid was now
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based on Total Aidable Pupil Units (TAPU) ■ ^  Also, a new type of save 
harmless provision was initiated.
Because of the foundation nature of the formula, state operating aid 
was based on the difference between $1,200 per pupil, and the amount of 
money per pupil a district could raise levying a 15 mill tax rate:
(3) AD±t - 1200 - (.015 <FV>1(t_,2)/RWADAt-2)
where
ADft “ state aid per TAPU in district i in time t; and
other variables defined as above.
Even under this system, the aid to the wealthier districts was not 
allowed to drop to zero. If a district's wealth was between $52,800 and 
$101,000 per RWADA, the following taper formula was applicable:
(4) ADit = 360 + .001(101,000 - ^ ^ ^ /RWADA1 ).
Finally, districts with full value greater than $101,000 per RWADA re­
ceived a flat grant equal to a new level of $360 per TAPU.
Because the 90% limit on the state share was retained, districts 
with wealth of less than or equal to $8,000 per RWADA did not receive aid 
in proportion to this formula. The state’s share per pupil is multiplied 
by a measure of pupils to calculate total operating aid. The most sig­
nificant change in this legislation was the change from using WADA as a 
measure of pupils to using TAPU as a measure.
Due to the new legislation, aid increased by $372 million. New York 
City received $127 million of the increase, in part due to the new 
weighting system (University of the State of New York, 1976). A new type 
of save-harmless provision was added to the aid scheme: all districts
would receive at least as much aid per pupil as it had received in 1
1 TAPU included new weightings to account for the different needs of 
specific districts. The weightings were to comply with the Fleischmann 
Commission findings. The following weightings were added to WADA to cal­
culate TAPU:
children with handicapping conditions 1.00
children with educational needs (low achievers
on the Pupil Evaluation Program tests) 0.25
pupils in approved summer sessions 0.12
pupils in approved evening sessions 0.50
secondary pupils not receiving additional weighting
as a handicapped or special educational needs pupil 0.25 
See the University of the State of New York (n.d.; 1976).
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previous years. The total aid save-harmless provision, in which no dis­
trict receives less total aid than in previous years, was also retained.
This new aid formula went into effect in the 1974-75 school year. 
But despite the several modifications in the aid formula described above, 
the boards of education of at least 27 school districts and the parents 
and guardians of a number of individual students remained sufficiently 
dissatisfied that they initiated the legal action mentioned above (Levity 
town v. Nyquist, 1978). One group of plaintiffs argued that because 699 
of 708 school districts across the state received aid under the save- 
harmless provisions, the 1974 state aid formulas substantiaHy con­
strained the equalization efforts of the State. Dr. Joel Berke offe 
testimony relating to the range in property wealth and disparities in ex­
penditures. According to Berke, the real property wealth in the rich­
est" district was 46 times as large as it is in the poorest district.
Because this range is affected by a very small number of extremely 
rich and extremely poor school districts, a more helpful comparison is 
the ratio of wealth"between the districts at the 10th and 90th percen­
tiles in a ranking of school district wealth from low to high. Wealth 
per pupil at the 90th percentile was $86,000 compared with $20,840 for a 
district at the 10th percentile.
The range in expenditures per pupil across all districts was from 
$396 to $4 125. This is a ratio of expenditures of approximately 4.5 to 
1 whereas an examination of the 10th and 90th percentiles indicates a 
range of approximately 1.9 to 1. Spending in the 90th percentile dis­
trict was $2,051 compared with $1,089 in the 10th percentile district.
A somewhat more complete picture of these inequities is provided in 
table 4, but without the data used in constructing the table, it is im­
possible to develop a more complete measure of inequity based on Gin 
coefficients or entropy measures of inequality (Theil, 1967). y
case, using the midpoints of the ranges in taxable wealth categories, 
the simple correlation coefficient between wealth per pupil and both 
operating and total expenditures per TAPU was over 0.98. However, the 16
16From a legal perspective, the extremes in both spending and wealth
are significant because equal protection provisions of the Constitution 
must be enforced regardless of the number of schools or individual stu­
dents involved. Information concerning the 10th and 90th percentiles 
more critical from the standpoint of understanding the magnitude of t 
problem. One can obtain some idea of the magnitude of the problem at the 
extremes from evidence provided by the Governors Advisory Panel of Con­
sultants (The New York State Special Task Force, 1980). In 1974 >
there were 44 districts with property wealth per P^P1* le8s ^  
$15,000. Average expenditures in these districts were $1, 8 . 
other hand, 21 districts had a property wealth per pupil between $120, 
and $330,000.
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correlations between tax rates and operating and total expenditures were 
0.58 and 0.54, respectively. Tax rates and property wealth had a corre­
lation coefficient of 0.65. Thus, the direct relationship between per 
pupil expenditures and wealth in 1974-75 was significantly stronger than 
the relationship between expenditures and local tax effort.
Table 4. Wealth, School Expenditures and Tax Rates in New York School 
Districts, 1974-75
Taxable 
Wealth 
per Pupila
#
Districts
Expend!ture/TAPU 
Operating Total
School Tax Rate 
per $1,000 
Full Value
of Property
Under $20,000 58 $1,098 $1,504 $15.74
$20,000-27,999 150 1,230 1,631 18.78
28,000-35,999 132 1,333 1,713 20.20
36,000-43,999 97 1,484 1,871 21.96
44,000-51,999 69 1,511 1,919 21.48
52,000-59,999 46 1,688 2,147 22.48
60,000-67,999 30 1,708 2,202 22.57
68,000-over 122 2,041 2,566 19.71
New York City 
($71,981 Full 
Value/pupil 
1974-75)
$1,951 $2,601 $21.88
Source: The University of the State of New York (1976).
a The data in the table are averages for districts in the corresponding 
taxable wealth class.
The second group of plaintiffs, consisting mainly of the state's 
four largest cities, offered a "municipal overburden" argument. They •
• • . introduced evidence to show that the ability of city
school districts to support education is impaired by a demand 
for non-school public services that is greater in cities than 
in suburbs or rural areas. They argued that the greater size 
and density of cities create a greater demand for police, fire, 
sanitation and related services. They further alleged that 
cities are disadvantaged relative to other areas because
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greater proportions of their populations are poor and dependent 
persons who require expensive social services. Because propor­
tionately more local revenues are devoted to these non-school 
services in urban areas, proportionately fewer local tax dol­
lars are available for public schools. The state aid formula 
uses only property wealth to measure a district fs ability to 
raise local revenues; the plaintiffs-intervenors therefore 
argued that it does not take into account the diminished abili­
ty of cities to support schools that results from this non­
school service burden and for this reason, it overstates the 
ability of cities to support education (The New York State 
Special Task Force, 1980, p . 51).
Two other issues were raised by the second group of plaintiffs. 
They argued that the state aid formula is seriously defective because of 
its failure to account for the difference in educational costs among 
school districts. Data compiled in a study made under the auspices of 
the Education Committee of the New York Senate indicated that the cost 
per pupil for the state-mandated minimum educational program among metro­
politan area school districts was 29% higher than the average expenditure 
level required in rural districts. Another indication of these differ­
ences is suggested in the cost of classroom teachers, the largest single 
component of school costs. In 1974—75, the average classroom teacher 
salary in the New York City metropolitan area was approximately $16,500, 
30% higher than the average salary in the upstate'area (data contained in 
Levittown v. Nyquist, 1978).
A final issue raised by the large urban school districts dealt with 
the way in which the number of pupils was measured for calculating total 
state aid. They objected strongly to using average daily attendance fig­
ures because most school operations must be designed to accommodate total 
enrollments regardless of the fact that absentee rates may be high and 
attendance sporadic. Additional costs may be required in schools of high 
absenteeism because of the need to provide repetition and remediation to 
assist pupils whose learning process is impaired by frequent absences.
From evidence provided, the Court concluded that equal educational 
opportunities do not exist for all students in New York State. There­
fore, because the State is obligated to provide and maintain a system of 
free and common schools for all children, the current system of financing 
education violated provisions of the State Constitution. State aid leg­
islation is intended to remove inequities in fiscal capacity, but due to 
the use of the aid formula, flat grants, and save-harmless provisions, 
inequalities are perpetuated and the court held that equal protection 
under the law is denied the first group of plaintiffs. The court also 
concluded that state aid formulas did not consider special cases of 
municipal and educational overburden.
In rendering this decision, however, the court recognized that 
designing state aid was a legislative and not a judicial responsibility. 
Therefore, it was reluctant to recommend any specific change. Further­
more, the court realized that a drastic change in the method of financing 
education could have major impacts on students, taxpayers, and units of
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local government and that "[t]he legislature must be afforded an oppor­
tunity to develop a suitable plan for the revision of the state’s system 
of financing public education." (Levittown v. Nyquist, 1978, p. 118).
This court decision was recently overturned under appeal so that 
legally the Legislature and the Department of Education are not required 
to make any changes. However, the state aid formula is constantly under 
careful scrutiny and revision. In 1978-79, the state returned to an old 
ratio formula similar to that used in 1970-71.
1978-79 Aid Formula
Even though the legislation passed in 1978 involved an aid ratio 
formula, it was substantially different from the one in operation in
1970-71. A major change was that two separate foundation levels were now 
defined for "equalization” districts. In keeping with some of the provi­
sions of the 1974—75 formula, the flat grant and taper formula remained 
in effect for the richer districts (The University of the State of New 
York, 1978). The new aid formula for "equalization" districts was 
defined in several steps, based on both spending levels and property 
wealth. For districts that were spending relatively little per pupil and 
whose property wealth was less than $85,800 per RTAPU (Resident TAPU), 
the aid per TAPU in district i in year t was:
AID’ /TAPU = 1450(1- FVi(t-2)/RTAPUi(t-2) 0.51);
AFVRTAPU,(t-2)
for FVi(t^2)/RTAPU(t-2) ~ 85>800 
and A0Ki(t_1)/TAPUi(t_1) <1,450
where
AFVRTAPU^t_2 ) “ state wide average full value property wealth per
resident total aidable pupil units; and where other variables are 
defined previously.
It was not necessary for A0E^t_ to be $1,450 per TAPU to receive this
amount of aid. However, as in previous years, aid per TAPU could be no 
greater than 90% of the foundation level.
In order for the second tier equalization aid to be operative, dis­
tricts must have had AOEj^  in the base year (t-1) of more than $1,450 per 
TAPU. These districts essentially received tier 1 aid (equation (5)) for 
the first $1,450 of approved operating expenses in the base year. If 
A0Rl(t-1)was between $1,450 and $1,500 and ^t 2 ^/RTAPUi(fc_2) was below
$73,750, a district received tier 2 aid. That is,
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(6) AID", / t a p t i  - ATP' /TAPU + E . . . (1-FV1( t-2) /RTAPUj.( t-2) 0.8)v ' it' it it it i(t 1) AFVRTAPU (t-2)
for FVi(t-2)/RTAPUi(t-2) < 73>75°17 
A0Ei(t-l) > 1450
Ei(t-1) “ 11111 [5°’ (A°Ei(t-l) " 1450)1'
The rationale underlying this second tier aid was to provide some addi­
tional assistance to some of the poorer districts that were spending more 
than $1,450 per TAPU- This aid was provided at a rate of $0-20 per dol­
lar of additional spending for the district of average wealth. It also 
dropped to zero as wealth increases before tier 1 aid did.
According to equation (5) equalization aid would ultimately fall to 
zero as a school district’s wealth per RTAPU increased to a level of 
$115,686. Rather than having aid fall this rapidly for all wealth dis­
tricts, aid to districts whose wealth per pupil was above $85,800 had the 
option of a second aid formula called the flat grant taper for these dis­
tricts. Aid was calculated in the following manner:
(7) AID it
FVi(t-2)
FVi(t-2)
/TAPU = 360 + .001(101,000 it
/RTAPUi(t_2) > 85,000
/RTAPU1 ( t _ 2 ) < 1 0 1 ,0 0 0 .
EVi(t-2)/RTAPUi(t-2));
At a wealth of $101,000, aid calculated according to this equation 
dropped to $360. For districts whose wealth was above this level, the 
flat grant provision was triggered.
Findings of a Task Force Studying Equity in Education
Although the 1978-79 aid formula was not designed specifically in 
response to the Levittown decision, a special task force was asked re­
cently to determine if the changes in the state aid formulas during the 
1970’s corrected the deficiencies noted in the court case. They directed 
attention on the 1974-75 and 1977-78 school years.
There are a number of ways in which one could examine the dispari­
ties in expenditures per pupil or in tax rates across school districts in 
New York. The situation is complicated considerably by the fact that 
published data are not available in a completely appropriate form. The 
Special Report of the Comptroller on Municipal Affairs contains much in­
formation on school finances, property tax collections for school pur­
poses and figures on enrollment and average daily attendance (State of
17The level at which the term in parentheses in equation (6) goes to
zero.
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New York Office of the Comptroller, 1978, 1979). Unfortunately, no pub­
lished data exist reporting TAPU by district, county or other geographic 
breakdown.
The Task Force attempted to make these comparisons by delineating 
approved operating expenses per TAPU ranked from high to low according to 
percentiles of students. As table 5 indicates, the maximum AOE/TAPU in 
any of New York1 s 700+ districts was $4,004 in 1974-75. At least one 
district was spending as little as $785 per TAPU in this year. At these 
extremes, the absolute disparity between districts in 1977-78 increased 
slightly. The per pupil spending ratio between the highest and lowest 
district rose from 5.1 to 1 in 1974-75 to 5.8 to 1 in 1977-78, at which 
time the highest spending district spent $5,753 per TAPU and the lowest 
$989 per TAPU. Although there is no reason to expect expenditures would 
not increase over this three-year period, spending per pupil at these two 
extremes increased at significantly different rates.
Table 5. Change in Approved Operating Expenditures per Pupil (TAPU) by 
Percentiles, New York State (1974-75 to 1977-78)
Percentile 
of Students
Approved 0p<erating Expenditures Per Pupil (TAPU)a
1974-75 1977-78 Change
Number
1974-75/1977-78
Percent
1st $ 785 $ 989 $ 204 26.0
10th 1,117 1,389 272 24.4
20th 1,192 1,472 280 23.5
30th 1,251 1,542 291 23.6
40th 1,341 1,639 298 22.2
50th 1,425 1,788 363 25.5
60th 1,510 1,899 389 25.8
70th 1,602 2,015 413 25.8
80th 1,795 2,255 460 25.6
90th 1,950 2,470 520 26.7
100th 4,004 5,753 1,749 43.7
Source: Reproduced from the New York State Special Task Force on Equity
and Excellence in Education, 1980, p. 25a.
a The expenditure figures shown here have not been adjusted to compensate 
for inflation, therefore the percentage increases appear larger because 
of the inflated value of the dollar.
This is not true among the largest proportion of districts. At the 
90th percentile in 1974-75, per pupil spending was $1,950 while at a 
level of $1,117 per pupil at the 10th percentile, a ratio of 1.7 to 1. 
In 1977-78, the ratio increased slightly to 1.8 to 1 with the 90th
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percentile spending $2,470 per pupil and the 10th
of $1,389. Expenditures between the 10th and ^  rcentlie.
22 2% in the 40th percentile to a high of 26.7* in t £
This is in contrast to the 43.7% increase for the district with the high-
est approved operating expenditures.
-hoof yehar chang^Tn /iftrfcfs f“«
ine this three-year period. To do this, it ramea ^
low to high according to the amount of their pupil spend! g
tricts divided into 10 groups with approximately the 7 7 “ RTAPUin the
k 1a Pimn Units. In 1977-78, for example, wealth per RTAPU in tne
highest spending decile was 3.3 times greater than the Lsen-
est spending decile. Table 6 contains the reverse relationship, ess 
tially comparing the relationship between full value per RWADA, A0E pe 
TAPU and full value property tax rates. Accoraing^y, y *
hieheat wealth decile was 61% higher than that in the lowest decile, but 
property tax rates In the highest decile were only approximately 2.5% 
higher than in the first decile.
In an attempt to summarize the relationship between A0E per pupil
and full value per pupil, the Teak Force ^ T t  tofull
ticity of approved operating expenses per pupil pett 1 1 .
value per pupil. In 1974-75, this elasticity was equal, to 0.41 and by
1977-78, the elasticity had fallen slightly to 0.3 .
Although the Task Force did attempt to examine the changes over time 
in the"disparities in school spending, wealth and tax effort they do not
examine explicitly the fiscal situation among ^ / ^ " ^ ^ r a t L  for-
on fi rqt vear in which the state had returned to an aid ratio
muia based on "two tiers of aid. Data obtained ? “ * * * £  l o r M t * .
Deoartment of Education enables this analysis to be con .
text of this study, in which case they provide a base of comparison 
the programming analysis of financing alternatives described in the nex
section.
Analytical Methods for Studying School Finance
ZTThe i^^^veme n t^ba sic ally ^ t e l f  frot^the fact ^ hat education is one
of the governmental functions c ^ W i ^ n  Muc.l
In New York State, for example, the State lonsutuuuu
5-8While comparisons of this nature do reflect the *n ^ r s 0 are
operating expenses in the particular^ year 7 7  from
yHfflrnlt to interpret because individual school districts cd
onf percentile to another in any ranking from low to high in terms of
approved operating expenditures per TAPU.
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Table 6» The Relationship Between Full Value Per Pupil (RWADA), Approved 
Operating Expenditures Per Pupil (TAPU) and Full Value Property 
ft* Rate <in Mills> pupU Weighted Deciles, New York State
Deciles of Full Value 
Per Pupil (RWADA) 
(Average Value)
Approved Operating 
Expenditures Per 
Pupil (TAPU)
Property Tax Rate 
(Full Value, in Mills)
First Decile
($ 30,472) $1,455 16.09
Second Decile 
( 37,982) 1,571 18.86
Third Decile 
( 42,299) 1,664 20.92
Fourth Decile 
( 46,466) 1,641 18.98
Fifth Decile
( 50,865) 1,725 20.46
Sixth Decile 
( 56,514) 1,825 20.78
Seventh Decile 
( 62,923) 1,931 21.64
Eighth Decile 
( 71,696) 2,021 21.03
Ninth Decile 
( 86,756) 2,203 21.57
Tenth Decile 
( 132,670) 2,648 20.18
New York City:
( 81,506) 2,101 22.52
Rest of State: 
( 61,732) 1,867 20.05
Statewide Average: 
( 67,715) 1,938 20.79
Sources Reproduced from the New York State Special Task Force on Equity 
and Excellence in Education, 1980 p. 26a.
tion Article which reads: "The legislature shall provide for the
and support of a system of free common schools wherein all 
the children of this State may be educated" (Art. XI, Sec. 1),
The economic arguments stem from the fact that education has both
private and public good attributes. From one perspective, for example, 
it is certainly possible to exclude students either in total or in part 
from the educational process. A student could be denied access to a
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classroom or denied access to educational resources through overcrowding 
or the failure to purchase certain educational materials. Exclusion 
could also be accomplished through the market by charging prohibitively 
high tuitions or other user charges. These are all characteristics o 
private goods, as is the major benefit associated with education. An in- 
dividual student has exclusive access to his or her inventory of human 
capital acquired through the educational process.
However, as Hirsch and Marcus (1966) suggest,
[t]he benefits of education can be looked upon as the increased 
resources available to society, i.e., both those which contrib­
ute to society's economic well-being and those which are embod­
ied in the educated person and permit him to participate in 
society more fully (p. 48).
These benefits can be both direct and indirect as well as accrue over the 
short run or the long run. Perhaps the most immediate and tangible bene­
fits to education are in terms of an increase in a student's productivity 
and disposable income in future years. Less tangible are the consump­
tion" benefits from education a student might receive in later years.
From society's point of view, the potential decrease in the demand 
for public services resulting from a decrease in social and personal 
problems which are often associated with inadequate schooling may be an 
important benefit with a public good dimension. The same is true of edu­
cation induced increments in the social product of second parties who 
come into contact with educated students. Finally, there are long-term
intangible community benefits associated with a relatively well-educated 
electorate.
The situation is even more complex in a society which is extremely 
mobile. Because many of the private and public benefits associated with 
education are realized in the area immediately surrounding the educated 
person's residence, some benefits resulting from public education sup­
plied in one school district may ultimately be realized by residents o 
another. Benefits can flow into a school district (spillins) or they can 
flow out of it (spillouts). See Hirsch et al. 1964 and Hines and 
Tweeten, 1972 for attempts to measure the magnitude of these effects.
There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that education has both 
private and public good dimensions. What is not clear is how these pub­
lic good dimensions necessitate public involvement in the provision o 
educational services. This can be understood most easily if one views 
education as a good with which there are associated positive externali­
ties. The external economies, in terms of societal benefits, can be rep­
resented in figure 1. The curve labeled Dp represents the individual 
student’s demand for education, reflecting only the private benefits 
which accrue to the student directly. Because of the public goods as­
pects of education (Dg) is society's demand for education, output would 
be 0p units and price would be Pp if production were left solely in the 
hands of the private sector.
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FIGURE I. DEMAND FOR EXTERNAL ECONOMIES
From society’s point of view, the demand for educational services, 
Dt, is reflected in the vertical summation of Dp and Dg. Given the sup­
ply curve in figure 1, the optimal output of education from society's 
point of view is actually Qe instead of Qp as would be indicated by 
strictly private decisions. Thus, a private market for education would 
lead to underinvestment.
The situation is complicated by the spillover nature of many of the 
benefits and costs of education. From society's point of view, one might 
argue that the spillin benefits and costs exactly offset the spillout 
benefits and costs. Accordingly, this situation causes no difficulty 
when education is viewed from a state or national perspective. From the 
local perspective, the situation can be quite different. For those dis­
tricts who receive a net spillin, the situation can be viewed as a wind­
fall over which they have little or no control. For a school district 
whose students usually migrate to other parts of the state or nation, the 
spillout benefits associated with these students leaving the area can be 
viewed as an external diseconomy.
Consider the case of a school district with significant spillout 
benefits, a district which loses its educated students through migration 
to other areas. Figure 2 illustrates this type of school district. Let 
Dp represent the private market demand for educational services. The 
optimal output without considering spillouts or spillins is Q .
Jr
If one assumes for simplicity that all society's benefits to educa­
tion are exported along with the students as they leave the area, there 
is essentially a net cost to the local society associated with providing
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FIGURE 2. DEMAND FOR SPILLOUT BENEFITS
education. Society demands no education at a positive price and would in 
effect demand education only if it were paid to do so. Society s demand 
curves would be positioned in the fourth quadrant. The vertical summa 
tion of these two demand curves results in a total demand, , which lies 
below the private individual's demand for education. Although Qt is an 
optimal quantity of education from the local community's point of view, 
it represents an underinvestment in education both from the standpoint of 
individual students and society as a whole.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument would lead one to 
an educational system funded at the national level. For political rea­
sons , education has been relegated to the states and it is unlikely that 
a national system of financing education will develop in the near fu­
ture . The above argument is applicable at the state level as well be­
cause spillover benefits accrue routinely among districts within a 
state. By providing some assistance, through state aid or other means, 
one can counteract the underinvestment in education that is likely to
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occur in those districts where spillouts occur. This state involvement 
does nothing to mitigate the consequences of the external effects among 
various states or regions of the country.
To identify the exact nature of the financial assistance needed to 
counteract these effects, one must have specific information about the 
supply and demand curves for education facing school districts throughout 
the state. Obviously, this information is unavailable and alternative 
systems of school finance must be evaluated on the basis of different 
criteria. The criteria often include but are not limited to considera­
tions of economic efficiency (in terms of cost minimization or revenue 
maximization), equal educational opportunity and taxpayer's equity.
Colburn (1981) describes a number of analytical procedures for 
analyzing changes in school financing and state aid arrangements. The 
simplest approach is an ex ante comparison of changes in expenditures, 
revenues, tax rates, etc. resulting from proposed modifications in aid 
formulas prior to implementation. This strategy, or an ex post evalua­
tion, has been used by state agencies and researchers alike (e.g., New 
York State Budget Division, Education Unit, 1978; Johnson and Collins, 
1979). While analyses of this kind provide valuable disaggregate infor­
mation on the impact of specified policy changes, there is no guarantee 
that the alternatives under study are in anyway optimal according to one 
or more performance criteria.
Educational financing alternatives can also be examined by economet­
ric or mathematical programming methods. For example, White and Miller 
(1976) have analyzed a district power equalization (DPE) aid scheme for 
the state of Georgia with a four equation model in which four endogenous 
variables, tax effort, achievement, total expenditures and local expendi­
tures, were related to a number of socio-economic shifters in the school 
districts® This model was developed so that equilibrium expenditure 
levels could be determined simultaneously with state aid provided under a 
specific aid ratio. The authors argue that by formulating this structur­
al model of educational demand their simulation analysis would generate 
equilibrium levels of educational expenditures in each school district 
given that the endogenously determined expenditure levels, combined with 
state aid are those which could be financed with a common tax effort 
statewide.
This particular econometric formulation was facilitated considerably 
by the fact that school districts in Georgia are organized along county 
boundaries. Had this not been the case, it would have been Impossible to 
collect the socio-economic information required in estimating the econo­
metric model. Thus, in addition to the conceptual problems involved in 
estimating the demand for a public good, the fact that school districts 
are not organized along county boundaries would make it difficult to 
develop such a model for New York.
Bruno (1968) was perhaps one of the first individuals to use mathe­
matical programming to examine school financing alternatives. His study 
dealt with the California Junior College Support Program, but the state 
aid to this junior college system was apportioned in a way quite similar
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to the New York State Aid formula of 1974-75* Within this optimizing 
framework, Bruno was able to develop different state aid formulas that 
would minimize uniform tax rates, maximize total expenditures, minimize 
state costs or minimize overall costs- The programming model was par­
ticularly appropriate in the case of a foundation type state support pro­
gram because the aid formulas could be specified as a series of linear 
constraints, and the several objectives could be optimized individually 
subject to minimum expenditure levels, maximum state shares and/or mini­
mum tax rates.
The Linear Programming Model
Because of its relative simplicity and flexibility, New York school 
financing alternatives are studied within a linear programming frame­
work. The programming model allows one to examine the tradeoffs among 
the provision of equal educational opportunity, equity from a taxpayer's 
perspective and budgetary limitations-
The model is flexible enough so that different aid formulas used 
throughout the past decade and in other states, such as DPE in Wisconsin, 
can easily be incorporated and alternative objective functions including 
maximizing expenditures or minimizing state aid can be examined. The 
characteristics of the school districts and the representation of alter­
native aid formulas are accommodated within four types of constraints: 
state aid constraints, expenditure constraints, tax rate constraints and 
accounting constraints. The decision variables include: state aid per 
TAPU; local expenditures per TAPU; tax rates for each school district; 
and state shares of tier 1 and tier 2 ceiling levels for the district of 
average wealth.
Constraints: The first set of constraints are those representing the
two-tier state aid formula. The general aid formula for the 1980-81 
school year is similar to the one in equations (5) and (6). For dis­
tricts receiving both tiers of aid (i=l,*.. »m):
(8) AIDit/TAPUit = C1 (!- FVi(t-2)/RTAPUi(t-2) XL) +
FVc 2 a -  ±(t-2)
AFVRTAP^fc_ 2  ^
/RTAPUi ( t - 2 ) x 2);
AFVRTAPU(t-2)
where
AIDjLt/TAPUij- = district operating aid per TAPU;
- first tier expenditure ceiling level per TAPU;
C2 - second tier expenditure ceiling level per TAPU;
X^ = portion of raised by local district of wealth equal to 
AFVRTAPU(t_2);
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X2 = portion of C2 raised by local district of wealth equal to
AFVRTAPU .;
( t  2 )
AFVRTAPU . ^
( t  2)
= some measure of district wealth (historically, 
AFVRTAPU ^as teen the state average full
value of property per some pupil measure for 
wealth; lagged two years);
FV.( /RTAPU.( = a measure of the ith districts’ wealth
* ' C ) per pupil measure; and
t = current school year in which aid is apportioned.
By collecting the terms containing decision variables, the constraint in 
the,programming model becomes:
(9) AIDit/TAPUlt + Cx (FVi(t-2)/RTAFUj(t-2) Xx) +
AFVRTAPU
( t - 2 )
C2 (FVi(t-2)/RTAFlJi(t-2) X2) = C1+C2
AFVRTAPU (t-2)
for i = (1, ... m), the districts receiving both tiers of aid.^ In 
some two-tier aid systems, relatively richer districts may only receive 
tier 1 aid. District aid to these districts is given by:
(10) AIDlt/TAPUit = Cx (l - FVi(t-2)/RTAPUi(t-2)
AFVRTAPU.(t-2)
for i = (m+1, ... n), the n-(m+l) districts receiving only tier 1 
aid.
The constraint becomes:
(11) AXDit/TAPUit + Cx (FVi(t-2)/RTApUj(t-2) Xx) = Cls
AFVRTAPU, „v (t-2)
If a flat grant provision is included in the aid formula for the "rich­
est" school districts additional constraints are needed:
(12) AIDit/TAPUlt = FG
for i * ((n+1), ..., r) with r-(n+l) districts receiving flat 
grant aid; and
FG = the specific flat grant level of aid per TAPU and
2^The second tier of aid is for districts with relatively high 
spending levels and low wealth.
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(13) AIDit/TAPUit >. fg
for i - (1, n) all districts not receiving flat grant aid.
Constraint (13) insures that aid to all districts not receiving flat 
grant aid is greater than or equal to the flat grant level.
Careful examination of equations (9) and (11) indicates that they 
are non-linear in two of the important parameters of the state aid for­
mula, Ck and Xj. Thus, it is impossible within a linear programming con­
text to determine optimal levels of both state shares and ceiling levels 
simultaneously. The strategy employed below is to fix the C^’s at vari­
ous levels and solve for optimal state shares, given specified objectives 
and other constraints.
Expenditure constraints are incorporated into the model to set maxi­
mum and/or minimum expenditure levels for each district: if both maximum
and minimum constraints are used, school districts are forced to spend 
within some range
(14) Ei t >MNEit;
and
(15) Eit < MXElt;
for i = (1, ..., r) all districts;
Eit ~ actual expenditure level per TAPU in year t;
MNEit = minimum expenditure level per TAPU; and
MXE^t ~ maximum expenditure level per TAPU.
Actual expenditures or some assumed expenditure levels which attempt to 
equalize educational opportunity across districts can be incorporated 
into the programming model using these equations.
Contraints on local tax rates are required because of legal limits 
on the taxing power of school districts or for equity considerations 
across taxpayer groups.^1 If the objective is to minimize state aid, tax 
rates must be constrained from above to keep state aid from falling to 
zero. Tax rate constraints are given by:
(16)
and
Rit < MXRit II ..., r);
(17) Rit > MNRlt i = (1, *.., r),
^These types of constraints, which require a variable not to exceed 
a specified limit or restrict the value to be above some level are 
treated as bounded variables; a modified version of the simple algorithm 
using bounded variables included in the IBM MPSX linear programming pack­
age is used to solve the programming model. See Gass (1976) for the 
mathematics of bounded variable problems.
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where = tax rate (per unit wealth);
MXR-£t = maximum tax rate; and
MNRit = minimum tax rate.
Other constraints must also be included to insure the appropriate 
relationships among state aid, local expenditures, total expenditures and 
tax rates are maintained. Total expenditures per TAPU must equal the sum 
of local expenditures per TAPU plus state expenditures per TAPU,
(18) AIDit/TAPUit + Lit - Elt 
for = local expenditures per TAPU.
Local expenditures are related to tax rates by:
(19) -Lit + Rit (FVi(t-2)/RTAPUi(t-2)) “ 0
22
Total state aid is calculated by multiplying state aid per TAPU for 
each district by TAPU and summing over all districts.
r
(20) £ AIDit/TAPUit (TAPUit) - TS = 0,
i=l
for TS = total state aid.
Total local expenditures are calculated in the same manner:
r
(21) I Lit(TAPUit) - TLt - 0. 
i-1
In 1980-81, New York State apportioned aid using a two-tier aid 
system.23 T h e  first expenditure ceiling, , in the model is set at
22p0r purposes of state aid ratios, it was appropriate to use the 
full value of property in year t-2 but because of lack of data, these 
same tax rolls were also used to establish tax rates in the model. The 
implications of this assumption are discussed in the next section.
23in past years formula aid has comprised approximately three- 
fourths of the total general operating aid apportioned by New York 
State. (The University of the State of New York, 1978-79 and the Univer­
sity of the State of New York, 1976.) In 1980-81, for example, New York 
State gave special aid to school districts. Districts received extra 
money for severely handicapped students. Districts taxing at rates above 
$20 per $1000 full value and a per pupil wealth below the state average 
were eligible for High Tax Aid. Low Income Supplemental School Aid 
(LISSA) was apportioned to districts with below average income per 
pupil. The save-harmless and flat grant provisions remained in the 
1980-81 formula. To the extent that this model does not account for 
these kinds of aid, tax rates in eligible districts could be decreased 
slightly without lowering expenditure levels.
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$1600 per TAPU for all districts eligible for tier 1 aid, C2 is $100; and 
the flat grant provision remained at $360 per TAPU.
New York used the full value of property per RTAPU as a measure of
wealth. AFVRTAPU, was equal to $69,472 in the 1980-81 aid formulas(t-2)
State shares of expenditure ceiling levels for districts of average 
wealth remained at 49 percent for tier 1 aid and 20 percent for tier 2 
aid. This is equivalent to setting X^ = 0.51 and X2 - 0.80 in the model.
The only remaining values needed are upper limits on tax rates, ex­
penditure levels and full values of property per RTAPU. These values are 
discussed in the Data Requirements section, where calculations needed to 
derive specific values are delineated.
Objective Function: Within this programming context, alternative objec­
tive functions could be explored. Maximizing total expenditures, mini­
mizing tax rates, and maximizing expenditures per TAPU are a few of the 
objective functions that could be examined with this model. In this
study, emphasis is placed on a system of minimizing state aid alloca­
tions . Operationally, total state aid is calculated by (20) and mini­
mized by:
(22) Minimize Z = TSt.
Minimizing total aid subject to specified maximum tax efforts and minimum 
expenditure levels allows one to examine the tradeoff among alternative 
allocations of state aid, school district tax efforts and taxpayer 
equity, total state costs, and school expenditures. In the simplest ver­
sions of the model decision variables are the state aid levels for each 
school district and the local tax rates. In more complex versions, the 
levels of and X2, state shares for tier 1 and tier 2 aid, are also 
decision variables.
With an objective function focused on the cost to state, implica­
tions of varying levels of X^ and X2 with respect to the state aid pic­
ture must be understood. In the existing aid situation, X^ is set equal 
to 0.51, X2 is equal to 0.8 and AFVRTAPU^^ is set at the state average
full value of property per TAPU. This implies that as property wealth 
increases, tier 2 aid falls to zero before tier 1 aid. If tier 2 aid is 
not allowed to go negative, as in the 1980-81 formula, some richer dis­
tricts will receive only tier 1 aid. At present, school districts with 
full value of property per RTAPU between $0 and $86,840 receive tier 1 
and tier 2 aid. Districts with wealth between $86,840 and $105,000 per 
RTAPU are too rich to receive tier 2 aid but not wealthy enough to re­
ceive flat grant aid; they are eligible for only tier 1 aid. Flat grant 
districts are those with full value of property per RTAPU in excess of 
$105,000. In the programming model these three types of districts are 
described by the three different state aid constraints in equations (9) 
and (11) and (12).
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Allowing and X2 to vary introduces potential problems into the 
model. As X2 increases* tier 2 aid can become negative.^ Because of 
the possibility of negative tier 2 aid, districts receiving tier 1 and 
tier 2 aid may now receive less aid than relatively richer districts 
presently receiving only tier 1 aid. This potential inconsistency is 
ruled out by simply placing an upper bound on X2 :
(23) X2 < UB
where UB is some upper bound which constrains tier 2 aid to be posi­
tive. ^
However, if no bound is placed on X2 > a preliminary analysis of Dis­
trict Power Equalisation (DPE) as implemented in Wisconsin in 1973 can be 
achieved. Under such a scheme, the state effectively guarantees a fiscal 
capacity for each local district equal to a specified level of property 
valuation per pupil. Once the desired level of spending is determined 
the district must impose the tax rate needed to raise this revenue if the 
guaranteed value of property per pupil were actually available. This tax 
rate is applied to the actual valuation of property in the district and 
the state pays the difference (Johnson and Collins, 1979). If districts 
receiving only tier 1 aid or flat grant aid are eliminated from the 
model, a modification of constraint (9) can be used to reflect a DPE 
scheme of this kind. Constraint (9) is changed to
(23) AIDlt/TAPDlt + CX FVi(t-2)/RTAFUi(t-2) + C2 FVi(t-2)/RTAPUl(t-2)
GVx GV<
= Cj + C2 for i = (1 
AFVRTAPU
, m),
where GVi = . ^  . rfTrT AFVRTAPU.(t-2) and GV2 = (t-2) .
Xl Xl
^Although Xi can vary, tier 1 aid cannot be negative. In the model 
AIDit/TAPUit as an activity in a linear program is constrained to be 
greater than or equal to zero. Because AID^t/TAPUlt in constraint (11) 
contains only tier 1 aid, tier 1 aid is forced to be positive or zero 
(without flat grant provisions). However, in constraint (9), AIDj_t/ 
RTAPU^t is the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 aid. Therefore, tier 2 aid can 
be negative as long as tier 1 aid remains greater than or equal to tier 2 
aid.
25The upper bound in this model is calculated by setting the tier 2 
aid ratio equal to zero for the richest district receiving tier 2 aid, 
and solving for X2 - Using the aid ratio for the richest group receiving 
tier 2 aid, X2 = 0.87. Setting UB at 0.87 insures positive tier 2 aid 
for all districts.
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In the DPE formulation, GVp and GV2 are two guaranteed full valua­
tion levels, set by the state.2® Because in the existing model not all 
of New York1s school districts are eligible for both tiers of aid, only 
preliminary results for DPE are reported in the next section. In this 
preliminary analysis, the two guaranteed full valuation levels are set to 
minimize state aid and, as in Wisconsin, tier 2 aid can go negative, su 
tracting from tier 1 aid. However, total aid must remain positive.
Data Requirements
This programming model has one disadvantage. For each school dis- 
trict there are at least five constraints and a model containing all 700+ 
districts in New York State would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
manage, not to mention the excessive cost in obtaining a solution. To 
circumvent this problem, the 700+ school districts in New York are 
grouped into 79 aggregates according to wealth as measured by full value 
of property per RTAPU, approved operating expenses per TAPU, and TAPU. 
The total number of TAPU in a group is the sum of the TAPU in the group s 
component school districts, but each group is then treated as though it 
were a single district with characteristics reflecting the weighted aver 
age of the districts within the group.
The data were obtained from unpublished work sheets from the New 
York State Department of Education (The Budget Division, 1980). The work 
sheets contain estimates of operating aid for each school district based 
on the 1980-81 formula.
In order to examine the large urban school districts closely, the 
five New York City boroughs, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Yonkers and 
Albany are treated separately in the model. Other school districts are 
classified by three A0E groups; six wealth groups, including wealth cut 
off points which determine the type of aid to the district; and six 
groups of TAPU, used as an indication of school size. Each school dis­
trict is assigned to a group Guvw, where u is the uth approved operating 
expenditure/TAPU group; v is the vth wealth/RTAFU group; and w is the wth
^Guaranteed valuation levels are wealth levels set by the state 
which offer poorer districts taxing power equivalent to the set levels. 
For example, a district applies a particular tax rate to its local wealth 
base and if the local base is lower than the guaranteed level, the state 
apportions enough aid so that the sum of local and state revenues are 
equal to the revenues that could be raised locally at the same tax rate 
but applied to the guaranteed wealth level.
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TAPU group.27 The ranges for the groups are given in table 7. The large 
urban school district groups are described in table 8.
The wealthiest school districts were mostly, although not exclusive­
ly, in Suffolk, Nassau and Westchester counties. These districts also 
had the highest expenditure levels per TAPU. Poorer school districts, 
although not concentrated geographically, were more likely to be in up­
state areas. These districts spent at the lowest levels per TAPU. As 
the wealth of the district groups increases, moving from v-1 to v=6, ex­
penditures per TAPU also increase, implying a direct relationship between 
wealth as measured by full value of property per RTAPU in 1978-79 and
1979-80 expenditures per TAPU*
No clear pattern exists linking the number of aidable pupil units to 
levels of expenditures per TAPU. When districts are grouped bv AOE(t-1 )
/TAPU^_^ TAPU rises as expenditure groups increase from v=l to v=3. 
Grouping districts by T A P U ^  shows no consistent relationship between 
expenditure levels and total TAPU.
Urban area school districts including New York City, Buffalo, Roch­
ester, Syracuse and Albany contain 34% of the TAPU in New York State. 
New York City alone contains 30% of the state *s total. Approved operat­
ing expenditures in 1979-80 in all of these districts were above $2,200 
per TAPU. This is above the average for the state's other districts/
State aid constraints, equations (9-11), require a measure of wealth 
for each group. Weighted averages of full value of property per RTAPU 
are calculated by the following formula:
(24) FV /RTAPU , _p(t-2) p(t-2) =
FVuvw£p uvw(t-2)
RTAPU
uvwep uvw(t-2)
and p - 1,2, 79 are the 79 groups formed by the aggregations speci­
fied above. These values are then substituted into the state aid con­
straints.
Expenditure constraints, equation (14), require right-hand side val­
ues for each of the 79 groups. Several alternative expenditure levels 
per TAPU are examined: 1) 1979-80 approved operating expenditures, AOE;
27Any group with: v=3 contains districts with wealth/RTAPU slightly 
below the $69,473 state average; and v=4 contains districts with slightly 
above average wealth, Districts for which v=5 receive only tier 1 type 
aid. Groups for which v=6 include flat grant districts; and when v=l, 
2,3,4, districts receive both tier 1 and tier 2 aid. A summary of the 
grouped data used as coefficients in the model is provided in Appendix A.
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Table 8. Classification of Large Urban School Districts for 1980-81 
School Year
Districts TAPU, , (t) AOE/TAPU FV/RTAPU(t-2)
New York Citya 937,356 $2,290 $86,428
Buffalo 49,113 2,201 52,427
Rochester 36,247 2,621 52,427
Syracuse 22,795 2,261 62,558
Albany 9,439 2,234 93,167
Yonkers 23,193 2,790 96,570
Source: The Budget Division, "1980-81 State Aid Projections,
lished worksheets, Albany, March 1980. unpub-
a Includes the five boroughs, 
Manhatten. Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Richmond and
2) AOE increased by U.25%;28 3) A0E adjusted for inflation and cost of
tures“ tn an inf?Td " ffar“ tlalB amonS 8r°“P8; 4) equalized expendi­tures at an inflated statewide average AOE level; 5) equalized expendi-
tZll t o ^ t r ^ t h 0^ ^ ! ! 1/ / " 6^ 1313 ^  6) 3 levali^ - aP expenditure
All of the expenditure levels were calculated from 1979-80 approved
lowing1?ormula;11868' A“ /TAPU f°r eaCh gr°Up Were calcula^  by til fol-
(25) A°Ep(t-l)/TAPDp(t-l)
AOE , „,
U V W g p  uvw(t-l)
TAPU
uvwep uvw(t-1)
where p 1,2, ...,79 are the 79 groups formed by the aggregations sneci- 
fled above. Multiplying each AOE^/TAPU^ by 1.1125 adjusted the 1979-80 
spending levels for inflation. Equalized expenditures were set at the 
average A O E ^ ^ / T A P U ^ ^  adjusted for inflation for all groups.
eling-up expenditures were determined by ranking AOEj/TAPU. from high to 
low for the 79 groups and finding the expenditure level applied to the
65th .percentile PuPi:L (TAPU) from the bottom. District's expenditures 
were leveled-up to this value but school districts already spending at a higher rate were not leveled down. *penning at a
Two expenditure levels, inflated AOE and equalized .expenditures 
were also adjusted for differential costs of educational resources among
This is the inflation rate, 
dex, during the 1979 calendar year 
cil of Economic Advisors, 1980).
as measured by the Consumer Price In- 
(Joint Economic Committee by the Coun-
37
rt«r indices for New York State school 
districts. Utilizing dif:ferential c egated indices, weighted by
districts derived f f f T h e  model by the following
TAPU were calculated for the s
formula:^
vw gp(26) CIp ^ - ^
PFkl TAPU bb uvw uvw
TAPUuvw
uvw ep
where CIp - cost Index for group p;
CERI - cost index of educational resources derived by Wendling; and
p  =  1 , 2,...,79 are the 79 groups formed by the aggregations speci- 
fied above.
1t. the various expenditure
The aggregated indices were then differentials. This is an at-
levels to calculate AOE adjusted for co educational services.
tempt to adjust for the real cost of t0 a low 0f 0.85 in a
This index ranges from a high oved operating expenses per TAPU
group G3 U . This latter group had appro■ P RTAPU Ha3 less than
in 1 9 7 9 -8 0  of $1,909. lull »P««*  ^  ln 1980 -8 1  of 413.
$30,000 and the one 1 ® ^  York clty were above 1.0.
The indexes in all surburban areas and New
~  i, m (i1„ /iqyq) constructed cost in­
fusing regression analysis. Wend:li g ( J chera aad nonclassroom
dices indicating dif:Eereutial co>« and other characteristics.
professionals after con „ ® ln New york State was one with: a Mas
For example, an average „0rience in the school district, and e
ter's degree, ten years of per thousand students. The
ure. There was an average of . in New York State teaching in apredicted salary for the averageteacher dicted salary for the
specific district is district in the state to form a
average teacher teaching in the * d wlth a similar index for non­cost index. This information ls combined^wi^ ^  fQtm , cost-of-
classroom professionals and welSht^ “2 ®  using regression
education index. The 1sons':ruct^ ^  personal characteristics
analysis to predict teachers s experience, the nature of
of teachers Including their educat:Lon^:^^gression analysis also control- 
their appointment, and the including the pupil/teacher ratio, and
led for professional environment, unit. The fiscal capacity ofthe existence of a collective ^gainlng^unit.^  T ^  ^  q£ prope 
the school districts were reflectJ  return per district. The
per pupil and the gross income per incom regional character­
i z e d  the school district r i t i d d  the location of the district rela- 
istlcs such as population e y Finally, student's characteris
tive to metro areas relative> «  ^  readltlg and math scores,
tics as reflected in at^ exf.aXlCeJ ^ tud*ents Qr students with special edu- 
a nprrentaee of handicapped students
itional needs were included as explanatory variables.
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Finally, to minimize aid also recm-Fro* > i
on each group such that a maximum tax effort or a ° pl^ e t^x rate limlts 
set. Otherwise, state aid will faU to fero tL' ^  llalt ls
in the study, $45 and $35 per $1000 full va^e oTproperty^o"6"  aS8Umed
Empirical Results
tial experimentation*"^!^8 the^^ro^8 t0 the results of some,ini-
York described above A P sramm ^  model ot school finance in New 
Colburn (1981). ^  C°mplete descriPtio“ of the results is in
p u c e : / “  r d the * *bly contribute to equalizing i formulas that could possi-
operating expenditure levels o f  echo o l “ i  strlctTln*197 9 - ^ s fr  appr° ! f
v - » £ ■
are compared. The imr>Hr'ni--f on e un 8 from state and local sourcesdetail. implications for taxpayers are also examined in
carefully^6 ' T t *  3 "baSe ^  examined
situation in New tork St“ t. in ort«1o «rify th T ^ ’:1^  SCh°01 fln“ “
Other solutions of S Z T * * '
Base Case and Model Verification
state'^id^obtained1 under° c t n V t t o t T T 8 *' deSlgned t0 mlnlmizesituation as depicted in 1 9 8 0 -8 1 aTd olosely representing the existing 
York State Department o^ Education E x o e X  t  °b1talned from the Ne“ 
the same as 1979-80 a p p r o v e d ^  « *  aaau'“ ‘i t0 be 
allocation parameters are set at Xt = 0 a v ' * t*ie two state aid
grant provision remained at $360 per TAPO CeiH2 ~ ^  ^  the f la t
tax rates are set at $35 pe 00 fan ™, filings on local property
*  -  3b ^  “  t ^ ^ i n T
30
M n i « “ L  9« t / ^ V r t o f ^ i n  w  a ™ 3 8 ligb ^  ab° -  the
X2-0.89 and expenditures at 19) t S0V e ^ l s f T " 1” 8 Xl = ° '51* 
tures required tax rate l im its 'ju s t  unddr $45 per S o  ^  “ Pandl-
one p« p« *  ta* burdens,
the current year. These data are not ° 7 taXable for spools in
fore calculated on ™  there-
dure suggests that the tax rates reported are sUrfti 7 , , J Th proce_ 
he required to raise equal revenue from current tax ^ 1 1 ^ “ t h “
39
model acts as little more than an accounting device because all the 
parameters of the aid formula are specified.
Using the information in table 9, the base programming solution can 
be compared with the 1980-81 aid projections. In the base programming 
solution, school operating expenditures across the state would total more 
than $6.9 billion. This is less than 2% higher than the 1980 81 proje - 
tions. The slight discrepancy is explained by the fact that projected 
expenditures were calculated by summing 1979-80 actual approved operating 
expenses over all districts, while the programming model computes total 
expenditures by multiplying local and state expenditures per TAPU by
1980-81 estimates of TAPU. Between the two school years, TAPU increased
by nearly 2%.
Given these expenditure levels and the 1980-81 aid formula, approved 
operating expenses per TAPU in the base programming solution averaged 
$2,241 statewide. Of this total, $883 or 39% would be distributed 
through the state aid formula. The remaining 61% would be raised through 
local property taxes, at an average tax rate of $18.53 per $1,000 full 
value. (See footnotes 23 and 31 for an explanation of why relative 
changes in tax rates are more important than the absolute tax rates).
A more detailed analysis of this "base" situation is provided in 
table 10 in which information is provided for New York's six major cities 
and six groups of districts across the state. Approved operating ex­
penditures for these district groups averaged $1,923 in 1979-80, with the 
state sharing in 47% of this expenditure level. Even though the state 
shares only In some proportion of the first $1,700 in expenditures this 
percentage is remarkably close to the aid ratio of 0.49 set for tier 1 
aid for a district of average wealth. Approved operating expenses per 
pupil ranged widely, from a high in Yonkers of $2,790 to a l o w 0 $ >
in the group 1 districts (e.g., districts with the lowest wealth in terms 
of property value per student). State aid per TAPU is significantly 
higher in this group of districts ($1,329). State aid accounts for 78% 
of A0E in group 1 compared with 17% in Yonkers. Group 6 districts are 
the only ones that receive a smaller proportion of expenditures in state 
aid than Yonkers. These districts are extremely wealthy in property 
value per student and are subject to the flat grant provision in the cur- 
rent aid formula and are limited to aid per pupil of $3 0.
Local property tax rates needed to generate local shares of expendi 
tures vary widely as well. Tax rates in only one of the six large cities 
are under $20 per $1,000 full value. For the districts in the rest of
(footnote 31 (cont.))
is, these rates do not reflect the general statewide greases in the 
value of real property taxable for schools, estimated at 13/= between 19 5 
and 1977 and at 12% between 1976 and 1978 (Office of the State Comptrol­
ler, 1979). Consequently, emphasis is given to relative tax c anges 
throughout the analysis; they are inaccurate only to the extent tha 
property values have Increased disproportionately across school dis 
tricts. This also partially explains why tax rates in the model are 
allowed to Increase above the constitutional limit of $20 per $1,000 full 
value.
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Table 9. Approved Operating Expenditures, State Aid and Local Spending for 
Schools in New York
Item
1980-81 
Projectionsa
Base Programming 
Solution^
Percentage 
Difference Base 
is from Actual
Expenditures0
Total $6,801,330,180 $6,914,557,221 1.6
Per TAPUt 2,204 2,241
State Aidd (40.Q)e (39.4)
Total 2,723,445,495 2,724,836,248 0.5
Per TAPUt 882 883
Local Contribution (60.0) (60.6)
Total 4,077,884,685f 4,189,720,973 2.7
Per TAPUt
Local Property
1,321 1,357
Tax RateS
($/thousand of 
Full Value)
18.04 18.53
a Based on data from The Budget Division, 1980.
b Based on linear programming model described in section 3 and table 7.
C Total expenditures were assumed to be the same as 1979-80 approved operating 
expenses. Projected expenditures were calculated by simply summing the 1979- 
80 approved operating expenses for all districts. Total expenditures for the 
base run, however, were calculated by multiplying TAPU for 1980-81 by local 
spending per TAPU and state spending per TAPU and summing over all groups. 
Because the 1980-81 TAPU total (3,086,148) is 1.8% more than the 1979-80 total 
(3,032,605), total expenditures in the base run should over estimate slightly 
total 1979-80 approved operating expenses.
d Total state aid includes tier 1, tier 2 and flat grant aid for the base pro­
gramming solution.
e Numbers in parentheses represent percent of total expenditures, 
f Total local spending was computed by subtracting total state aid from total 
expenditures.
8 Tax rates based on property tax rolls in 1977-78.
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T a b le  1 0 . W e a lth , S t a t e  A id and P r o p e r t y T a x  R a te s  fo r
New Y o rk S ch o o l D i s t r i c t s , , by W e a lth  G roup
W e a lth  G roups3
FV/
RTApU ( t _ 2 )
1978-79
AOE/
TAPU( t - l )
1979-80
S t a te  A id /T A FU ( t )  
1980-8L B a se  LP 
P ro je c te d b Runc
P r o p e r t y  T a x e s  
ff i P e r  1 .0 0 0  F u l l  V a lu e )
1980-81 B a se  LP  19 7 9 -8 0
P r o je c te d  Run A c t u a le
New Y o rk  C i t y $ 8 6 ,3 3 8 $ 2 ,2 9 0
$ 803 $ 804 2 1 .7 0
2 1 .6 7 2 1 .3 5
( 3 0 .9 )
B u f f a lo 5 2 ,4 2 7 2 ,2 0 1
1 ,02 3 1 ,0 2 4 2 2 .4 5
2 2 .4 2 2 0 .2 0
( 1 .6 )
R o c h e s te r 6 9 ,9 7 5 2 ,6 2 1
797 797 2 6 .0 7
2 6 .0 7 2 4 .8 0
< i.2 >
S y ra c u se 6 2 ,5 5 9 2 ,2 6 1
892 893 2 1 .8 8
2 1 .8 7 2 0 .3 0
( 0 .7 )
Y o n ke rs 9 6 ,5 7 0 2 ,7 9 0
464 466 2 4 .3 0
2 4 .3 2 2 1 .9 0
( 0 .8 )
A lb an y 9 3 ,1 6 7 2 ,2 3 5
507 506 1 8 .5 5 1 8 .5 6
1 7 .5 0
( 0 .3 )
R e s t  o f  S ta te 6 7 ,0 4 8 1 ,9 2 3
910 910 1 4 .6 2 1 4 .6 2
1 4 .2 3
( 6 4 .4 )  
Group 1 2 8 ,8 1 0 1 ,6 9 9
1 ,3 2 8 1 ,3 2 9 1 2 .9 5
1 2 .9 4 1 4 .0 5
( 3 .1 )  
Group 2 4 3 ,2 5 5 1 ,7 2 1
1 ,1 4 2 1 ,1 4 2 1 3 .3 6 1 3 .3 7
1 3 .6 8
( 2 4 .5 )  
Group 3 5 6 ,5 6 5 1 ,7 8 5
942 942 1 5 .1 5  .
1 5 .1 5 1 2 .4 3
( 1 7 .9 )  
Group 4 7 7 ,0 9 5 2 ,0 1 7
707 706 1 6 .9 5 1 6 .9 6
17 .0 7
( 8 .0 )  
Group 5 9 5 ,4 8 5 2 ,2 6 1
475 477 1 8 .6 8
1 8 .6 6 1 5 .3 6
( 5 .0 )
Group 6 
( 5 - 9 )
1 5 8 ,4 9 2 2 ,5 3 4 360
360 1 4 .1 5 1 4 .1 5 1 2 .6 3
a See t a b le s  6 and 7 f o r  group d e f i n i t i o n s .  Group 1 re p re s e n ts  
s m a l le s t  f u l l  v a lu e  p ro p e rty  p e r TAPU . Numbers i n  p a re n th e se s
p e rc e n ta g e  o f t o t a l .
th e  sch o o l d i s t r i c t s  w it h  th e  
in d ic a t e  TAPU i n  each  group  a s  a
b The Budget D i v i s i o n ,  1980 and based  on 1979-80 AOE
c  See t a b le  7 f o r  "b a se  ru n " a s su m p t io n s .
d Based  on 1978-79  t a x  r o l l s .
e I a x  r a t e s  i n  th e  Do d e l a re  c a lc u la t e d  a s  R l t  «  ^ e ^ ^ ^ u l a t e d
RTAPU1 ( t - 2 )  a re  e q u a l to  a d i a l j r i c t ' a  io c a l  ! s Pe“ c™ ' o p e r a t i c  a id  w ere  d iv id e d  by
d i f f e r e n t l y .  T o t a l  AOE fo r  1979-80 m inus 197 80 ' ^ I f e r e n c e  o c c u rs  in  th e  use  o f  1 9 79 -80  f i n a l
Sr a f e s a f o r t h e hC 1ee r : ; .  “ /h t e rp e c t  s im i l a r  r e d u c t io n s  to  o c c u r  in  1980-81 i f  o th e r  
a id  f ig u r e  w ere  a v a i l a b l e .
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the state, property tax rates average $14.62 per $1,000 full 
there is a positive, but relatively weak, relationship between 
expenditures per pupil and tax rates. The poorest group of 
have an average tax rate of $12.94 per $1,000 full value, 
increases as one moves to groups of districts with more wealth 
until one reaches group 6. The wealth per student in group 6 
times as large as in group 1, yet the tax rate is only 10% 
group 6.
value and 
operating 
districts 
This rate 
per pupil 
is over 5 
higher in
. , . F*° ® policy Perspective, it is important to know the extent to 
which the flat grant provisions contribute to this relatively weak rela­
tionship. Group 6 districts are the only ones affected by this provi-
S1°J* flat grants t0 be eliminated from the aid formula, the local 
contribution to operating expenses from these districts would have to 
increase from $2,174 to $2,534 or by about 17%. Tax rates would remain 
below those in groups 4 and 5. Because less than 6% of the state’s aid- 
able pupil units are in flat grant districts, the impact on total state 
aid would also be relatively small. Total aid would fall from $2 725 
million to $2,606 million, a decrease of less than 5%. * *
Alternative Expenditure Levels under Existing 
Aid Structure
From the standpoint of calculating state aid, approved operating 
expenses are always lagged one year. In addition, the programming calcu­
lations for the base case and the implied tax rates assume that actual 
expenditures in 19-80-81 would remain at the approved levels in the pre­
vious year. This was appropriate in terms of verifying the model and
iqb^ q? 6 Sl age f°r the comParison of alternatives. However, actual 
1980-81 expenditure levels in most districts would undoubtedly be higher 
at least by some general rate of Inflation. To reflect this situation 
.^e, ^ sa expenditure levels in all districts were inflated by a constant 
11.25/., the rate of Inflation indicated by the Consumer Price Index dur- 
ing calendar year 1979. A summary of the programming results under these 
new expenditure levels is given in tables 11 and 12. In comparing this 
situation to the base case one can estimate the impact on local districts 
ot a state aid formula remaining constant for two successive years.
tv „ ThS>, lln®ar Pro8rammiP8 solution corresponding to this situation is 
LP Run 2. Total school expenditures in the state would rise from $6.9
billion to approximately $7.7 billion. Average expenditures per pupil 
would increase to almost $2,500 and range across the 79 school district 
aggregates used for programming purposes from $1,600 to $4,036 Der TAPII 
(see Colburn, 1981 for details). Because it is'assumed that state aidls 
no c anged, the state's share of total spending falls to 35% while the 
local share would increase to nearly 65%. Average tax rates would in- 
crease by nearly 18%.
o o
Because of the additional local effort required 
allowed to go above $35 per $1,000 full value. tax rates were
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T a b l e  1 1 .  A l t e r n a t i v e  A s s u m p t le n e  i n  th e  L i n e a r  P ro gr am m in g  Model
Asa umptlona_________
Run Humber
1  { B a s e  Run)
2 ( I n f l a t e d )
3  ( I n f l a t e d ,  C o s t  
A d j u s t e d )
4 ( I n f l a t e d ,  
E q u a l i z e d )
5 ( I n f l a t e d ,
E q u a l i z e d ,
C o s t  A d j u s t e d )
6 ( L e v e l e d - u p )
7 ( I n f l a t e d  W it hout  
f l a t  g r a n t )
8 ( 1 9 7 9 - 8 0  AOE
Optimal Xj,
X2 < 0 . 8 7 )
9 ( I n f l a t e d ,
O p t im a l  Xl t  X2 )
1 0  ( I n f l a t e d ,
Optimal X2 ,
X2 < 0 . 8 7 )
1 1  ( I n f l a t e d ,
E q u a l i z e d  
O p t im a l  X ^ ,  X2 )
1 2  ( I n f l a t e d ,
E q u a l i z e d ,
C o s t  A d j u s t e d )
1 3  ( I n f l a t e d ,  C o s t
A d j u s t e d ,  
O p t im a l  X l f  X2 )
i pt__
( a )  E x p e n d i tu r e / T A P l T
( b )  T i e r s  1  and 2 a i d  r a t i o
( c )  Tax r a t e  c e i l i n g
( d )  F l a t  g r a n t  l e v e l _________ _
S o l u t i o n
T o t a l
( m i l l i o n s )
P e r
TAPU
E x p e n d i t u r e s
S t a t e  Share* 
X
T o t a l
L o c a l  S h a r e
P e r P e r
TAPU
%
T o t a l
T a x
R a t e s
S / $ 1 , 0 0 0  FV
0 . 8 0
0 . 8 0
-  0 , 8 0
( a )  1 9 7 9 - 8 0  AOE
( b )  X !  -  0 . 5 1 ,  X2 
< c )  $ 3 5 / $ l , 0 0 0  FV 
( d )  $360/TAPU
( a )  ( 1 9 7 9 - 8 0  AOE) ( 1 . 1 1 2 5 )
( b )  Xl -  0 . 5 1 ,  X2 -  0 . 8 0
( c )  $ 4 5 / $ l , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $360/TAPU
( a )  1 9 7 9 - 8 0  AOE) ( l . H 2 5 ) ( C E R I ) b
( b )  ** 0 . 5 1 ,  X 2 -  0 . 8 0
( c )  $ 4 5 / $ 1 , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $ 3 6 0 /TAPU
( a )  $ 2 , 3 3 6
( b )  Xq “  0 . 5 1 ,  X2
( c )  $ 4 5 / $ 1 , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $ 3 6 0 /TAPU
( a )  ( $ 2 , 3 3 6 ) ( C E R I )
( b )  X 2 -  0 - 5 1 ,  X 2
( c )  $ 4 5 / $ l , 0 O O  FV
( d )  $360/TAP0
( a )  L e v e l e d - u p  to  6 5 t h  
p e r c e n t i l e 11
( b )  X i  -  0 . 5 1 ,  X2 "  0 . 8 0
( c )  $ 4 5 / $ l , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $360/TAPU
(a) (1979-80 A0E)(1.1125)
( b )  X2 -  0 . 5 1 ,  X2 -  0 . 8 0
( c )  $ 4 5 / $ 1 , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  0
( a )  ( 1 9 7 9 - 8 0  AOE)
( b )  X x -  0 . 5 4 ,  X2 -  0 . 8 7
( c )  $ 3 5 / $ l ,0 0 0  FV C
( d )  $360/TAPU
(a ) (1979-80 A0E)(1.H25)
( b )  Xi  -  0 . 3 7 ,  X2 -  0 . 0
( c )  $ 3 5 / $ l , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $360/TAPU
(a ) (1979-80 A0E)(1.H25)
( b )  Xx = 0 . 5 4 ,  X2 ■
( e )  $ 4 5 / $ l , 0 O O  FV 
( d )  $360/TAPU
( a )  $ 2 , 3 3 6
( b )  X i  -  0 . 4 9 ,  X2 ■
( c )  $ 3 5 / $ l ,0 0 0  FV
( d )  $360/TAPU
( a )  ( $ 2 , 3 3 6 ) ( C E R I )
( b )  X i  -  0 . 4 9 ,  X2
( c )  $ 3 5 / $ l , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $360/TAP0
( a )  (1979-80 A0E)(1.1125)(CERI)
( b )  XT -  0 . 2 2 ,  X2 -  0 . 0
( c )  $ 3 5 / 5 1 , 0 0 0  FV
( d )  $360/TAPU
0 . 8 7
0 . 0
0.0
$ 6 , 9 1 5 $ 2 , 2 4 1 $8 8 3
3 9 . 4  $ 1 , 3 5 8 6 0 . 6 1 8 . 5 3
7 , 6 9 2  
( 1 1 . 2 )a
2 , 4 9 2
( 1 1 . 2 )
883
( 0 )  (
3 5 . 4
[ - 1 0 . 2 )
1 , 6 0 9
( 1 8 . 5 )
6 4 . 6
( 6 . 6 )
2 1 . 9 6
( 1 8 . 5 )
7 , 7 6 6
( 1 2 . 3 )
2 , 5 1 6
( 1 2 . 3 )
883
( 0 )
3 5 . 1
( - 1 0 . 9 )
1 , 6 3 3
( 2 0 . 3 )
6 4 . 9
( 7 . 1 )
2 2 . 2 9
( 2 0 . 3 )
7 , 2 0 9
( 4 , 3 )
2 , 3 3 6
( 4 . 3 )
883
( 0 )
3 7 . 8
( - 4 . 1 )
1 , 4 5 3
( 7 . 0 )
6 2 . 2
( 2 . 6 )
1 9 . 8 4
( 7 . 1 )
7 , 2 6 3
( 5 . 0 )
2 , 3 5 3
( 5 . 0 )
883
( 0 )
3 7 . 5
( - 4 . 8 )
1 , 4 7 0
( 8 . 2 )
6 2 . 5
( 3 . 1 )
2 0 . 0 7
( 8 . 3 )
8 , 2 0 9
( 1 8 . 7 )
2 , 6 6 0
( 1 8 . 7 )
883
( 0 )
3 3 . 2
( - 1 5 . 7 )
1 , 7 7 7
( 3 0 . 9 )
6 6 . 8
( 1 0 . 2 )
2 4 . 2 6
( 3 0 . 9 )
7 , 6 9 2
( 1 1 . 2 )
2 , 4 9 2
( 1 1 . 2 )
844
( - 4 . 4 )
3 3 . 9
( - 1 3 . 9 )
1 , 6 4 8
( 2 1 . 4 )
6 6 - 1
( 9 . 1 )
2 2 . 5 0
( 7 1 ( 4 )
$ 6 , 9 1 5
(0)
$ 2 , 2 4 1
(0 )
5 844 
( - 4 - 4 )
3 7 . 7
( - 4 . 3 )
$ 1 , 3 9 7  6 2 . 3  
( 2 . 9 )  ( 2 . 8 )
1 9 - 0 7
( 2 . 9 )
7 , 6 9 2
( 1 1 . 2 )
2 , 4 9 2
( 1 1 - 2 )
1 , 0 9 6
( 2 4 , 1 )
4 4 . 0  
( 1 1 . 2 )
1 , 3 9 6  5 6 . 0
( 2 - 8 )  ( - 7 . 6 )
1 9 . 0 6
( 2 . 9 )
7 , 6 9 2
( 1 1 . 2 )
2 , 4 9 2
( 1 1 . 2 )
644
( - 4 . 4 )
3 3 . 9  , 1 , 6 4 8  6 6 . 1  
( - 1 4 . 0 )  ( 2 1 - 3 )  ( 9 . 1 )
2 2 . 5 0
( 2 1 - 4 )
7 , 2 0 9
( 4 . 3 )
2 , 3 3 6
( 4 . 3 )
9 5 5
( 8 . 2 )
4 0 . 9
( 3 . 8 )
1 , 3 8 1
( 1 . 2 )
5 9 . 1
( - 2 . 5 )
1 8 . 8 5
( 1 - 7 )
7 , 2 6 3
( 5 . 0 )
2 , 3 5 3
( 5 . 0 )
9 5 0
( 7 . 6 )
4 0 . 4
( 2 . 5 )
1 , 4 0 3
( 3 . 3 )
5 9 . 6
( - 1 . 7 )
1 9 - 1 5
( 3 . 0 )
7 , 7 6 6
( 1 2 . 3 )
2 , 5 1 6
( 1 2 . 3 )
1 , 2 7 9
( 4 4 . 8 )
5 0 . 8
( 2 B . 9 )
1 , 2 3 7
( 4 9 . 2 )
4 9 . 2
( - 1 8 . 8 )
1 6 . 8 9
( - 8 . 8 )
m -u “ kal"e
a  numbers i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  i n d i c a t e  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  fr o m  th e  b a s e  ru n . 
b  CERI a r e  c o s t  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e  I n d i c e s .  
c  The l e v e l e d - u p  e x p e n d i t u r e  l e v e l  was $ 2 , 5 4 6  p e r  TAPU.
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While expenditures are i n c r e a s e d a CO“'3b “ varyYr« amounts and in 
rates implied by this inflation ad JU.t«ntri.6 j ^ v «  7 « . . tax
most districts by more than the expenditure incre above wUat it
rate £or the six groups of would have to raise tax
is in the base run. However* g p general inflation rate while flat 
rates by over 507. to compensate fo 8 lncrease tax rates by only
grant districts, group > w0“ tb r 4 groups vary between these
s s  jnss.
.< " S . 1" i"aS -
if expenditures are increased and state expenditures, up
kers. for example, the state contributes 1 5 % of t0 tPwealth gr0up,
two percentage points from t h e base case. P
the state share is reduced to /VA.
Based on the detailed r e s u l t s £trientCOperspective^ lax rates 
ation cart be viewed from a siightly dr ^ £Prom $8.40 to $39.40 per
across the 79 school district agg 8 occurs within the flat grant
$1,000 full value. The low end of the r a g ^  associated with a district 
districts while the top end of S2 aid< Aa one might expect, the
aggregate receiving both tier . as in the base case, where the
range*in tax rates is is from $4.80 to $30.95
range in tax rates across the district aggL g
per $1,000 full value.
This analysis suggests that an the richer ones,
mu la is more critical for the poorer districts tha relative Ranges
A simple ratio of the relative changes in tax compare directly
in expenditures for the various^ groups on taP rates. Por
the effects of a one percent lncrease Pates must rlse by 2.4% for a
all six groups this ratio s“88®8 For the poorest districts, this
one percent increase m the slx group average (4.6%), while 
percentage is nearly double that ° (group 5) and flat grant dis-
in the districts receiving only * al, V | £  retes relative to an in-
tricts (group 6) the ^ n T . 3 % .
crease in expenditures per pupi
In evaluating these results some would argue M s J U
in poorer districts is less “ lc‘P.P or differential in-
because of differential costs o f J t o v l / d i s t r i c t s  may not 
flation rates the financial nee s exlst on relative rates of in­
rise as fast as in urban aJ“  ' lt ls impossible to examine the
flation in various school districts i us/ g an index for the cost
validity of this argument dlrec/ / ,  lans can be examined indirectly 
Of educational services, the i»pl ^  the base expenditure levels
(Wendling, 1979). That 1 , f a a second time to account for
adjusted for general inflation we 3 Tbe results of this adjust-
differential costs of educational services.
ment are also reported in tables 11 and 12.
sss‘ ™ “• “■*" *“  ll“‘
46
than) the general rate of Inflation when the cost index is laraer
(smalier) than unity. For the state as a whole, additional expenditures
in high cost districts relative to the state’s norm  n^re than of?fet anv
savings due to expenditure decreases justified in low cost areas but at
fer o f 6 i f f ’, spfendln8’ state al<*> and tax rates in the aggregate dif-
f lected  (table Ui  H ^  CaSe. ia Which only S ^ e r a l  inflation is re-riected (table 11). However, when taken as a group, the only districts
whose cost index exceed unity are the six major cities.33 F„r dlstrf!
aggregates in which the average cost index is less than unity expendi-
u es used m  LP Run 3 fall below those in LP Run 2. For example the
fheme s W e g a t e  spending the smallest amount under this cost adjusted 
scheme spends at a rate of $1,406 per TAPU. At the other end of the
range one district aggregate would have AOE of $4,271 per TAPU if this
s r .S - S u T ” p“ <*** «
... Th® imputations of these new spending levels are particularly sig­
nificant for some weaith groups. Were the state to attempt to minimize 
the possibility of further disparities in educational opportunity by en­
couraging districts to adjust any anticipated expenditure increases bv 
) wou°ld h services index, districts in the lowest wealth group (group 
1) wouid have to reduce expenditures by an amount nearly equal to the
York lould be h 1? lat1?"’ 0ther groupa °f districts7 i n s t a t e  New ■?ld b unable to raise expenditures sufficiently to compensate entirely for general inflationary trends. compensate
w f f  placln? a. burden on l0CE*l School districts, such cost adjustments
than S o T f n c f a f f f 1 b S n e f lt S  to local taxpayers. Rather than the more than 5 0% increase in property taxes required to finance increased ex­
penditures due to general inflation, tax rates would rise by leSS than f  
(compared to the base case) due to the cost adjustment. Tax rate de-
b f  less T a m a t f c '* °ther UP8tate distrlcts but the effects would
crease an avf aga" t0 ^  baS8 CaS6> tax rates would
... In *?f J ° rk City and other larSe cities around the state, the situa-ion would be reversed. Cost adjustments, implying expenditures in ex-
beSrequiredSa t0 kf P “P ,"lth the general rate of inflation wouldquired. When compared to the tax rates Implied by base level expen-
33This does not imply that all districts within each of the groups
diltrff f  be\ f  Unity’ For Programming purposes there wire 79district aggregates, 70 of which were distributed in groups 1-6 The
number of district aggregates with cost indices above unity were as fol-
lows= group 1, 0; group 2, 3; group 3, 3; group 4, 0; group 5 3- and 
group 6, 4 (see Colburn, 1981, for details). ’ 8 P ' and
. . f Evan f ougb the expenditure increases required as a result of cost
i n n f Z  T, ?  chan«6d significantly when compared to the general
infiationary situation, the poorer districts still must increase tax 
rates by a significantly larger percentage to increase expenditures by 
one percent than do the richer districts. P by
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ditures, property tax rates in New York City would increase by more t 
30%. Rochester, New York, would need the lowest tax rate increase of a 
major cities, only 19.3% above the base situation.
Forcing school districts to adjust expenditure increases to reflect
differences in educational services would be but an incremental step in 
equalizing educational opportunity as measured by real ^ districts at 
At the other extreme, one could equalize spending aar°a
some average level and adjust those expendlturesinturnbytheindeK or
cost of educational resources. These two situations are represented l 
tables 11 and 13.
Requiring school districts to spend at an average level can be 
viewedi n light of the direct relationship existing between property- *  ^ taptt ppcaus6 districts gsnsrsllywealth and expenditures per TAPU. t-n reach thesnend more per pupil, they would have to reduce expenditures to reach tne
average level, while poorer districts would have to raise expenditures.
This relationship holds true for the six aggregate weaUh group*.^ whe
expenditures are set at the state average AOE for 1979>-80 ad^ sta“ .
inflation. Group 1, for example* must increase expenditures by nearly 
24% over its previous level adjusted for inflation to reach this equ 
ized level of $2,336 per TAPU, while group 4 requires only 4% g r e a s e  
Richer districts in group 5 and group 6 would have to reduce expen i 
(7% and 17%, respectively), to spend at this equa U  zedaveragei evel 
would New York City and the other S urban areas. The^ largest rela.
reduction would occur in Yonkers (25/). The net eirecib ^  
forcing school districts to spend at the i n f l a t e d  but equalized level, 
of $2,336 per TAPU are a reduction in total spending of 5%, PP
mately $480 million, as compared with LP Run 2 (table 1 ) 
crease in property tax rates.
Financing these changes in expenditure levels requires a 
increase in average tax rates for the poorer wealth groups. 1 ^
2 must increase their taxing efforts by 79/ and 67/, respectively, 1
order to reach the equalized ^ e s e V e d u c t i o L
reduce tax burdens by about 9/ and 18/, respective y of the
are approximately the same as the spending level reduction • Of the
large urban districts, the largest reductions in tax rates are in Yonkers 
(29%) and Rochester (27%).
Some of the large increases in expenditures and tax rates in the 
lower wealth groups required for these groups to reach ^  averafe ^ e v ^
are partially offset when expenditures are adjusted f .
tional resource differentials among school districts ™is ^ t u a ^ o n ^ _
depicted in LP Run 5 (see table 11 and 13). In all s g p 
penditures as a result of the cost adjustment are lower than the $2 336 
eaualized level. In the first three groups they remain above 1979 
approved operating expenditure levels adjusted for inflation. or group 
4!Phoweve°rthe /eduction in expenditures due to the cost ^ “ nt out­
weighs the increase due to the equalization process. f
were spending at levels higher than the state average and their cost in 
dices are a U  greater than unity, the reduction in expenditures due to 
the equalization is somewhat dampened by the cost a justmen • 
the cost index is sufficiently high to more than compensate for the
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reduction and expenditures actually increased® Because in these analy 
ses, state aid has been fixed in dollar terms the tax rate changes im­
plied by these cost adjustments are similar to the expenditure changes® 
They are summarized in table 13 *
Although the idea of equalizing expenditure levels at some state 
average, either with or without a cost adjustment, is appealing, from a 
political perspective any reduction in school expenditures is difficult 
to implement. Such adjustments might ultimately be mandated by the 
courts, but an alternative might be to define equal educational oppor­
tunity in terms of some minimum level of expenditures® Such a procedure 
was recommended by the Fleischmann Commission in the early 1970 s in 
which operating expenditures would be leveled-up to the 65th percentile 
of districts when ranked from low to high in terms of spending per 
pupil. In the situation where 1979-80 AOE are adjusted for general in­
flation this 65th percentile would be at $2,546 per TAPU. Under this 
scheme, districts spending above this level would not be required to re­
duce their level of effort®
According to table 11 such a scheme would have a considerable impact 
on school spending statewide® Total operating expenses would rise^ to 8.2 
billion, a 19% increase over and above the 1979-80 levels, or 13% above 
the expenditure levels adjusted for inflation. With no change in the 
state aid formula, the state's share of school expenditures would fall 
from 39% in the base case to 33%. Average tax rates would increase to 
24.26 per $1,000 full value.
Most of this increase in tax rates occurs in poorer districts previ­
ously spending at levels well below $2,546 per TAPU. Compared with in­
flated expenditure levels group 1 has to more than double local school 
taxes while group 2 requires a 96% increase to meet the leveling—up 
expenditure floor (table 14). The richer groups, containing some school 
districts already spending above $2,546 per TAPU, are not affected as 
strikingly as groups 1 and 2• Groups 5 and 6 have to increase tax rates 
by only 10% and 14%, respectively, in order to comply with the new ex­
penditure levels.
Urban school districts are affected only slightly by leveling-up 
expenditures due to the fact that these districts are spending at high 
levels already. Rochester and Yonkers, for example, do not require any 
increases in tax rates or expenditures. The largest increase in expendi­
tures for the urban areas is 4% in Buffalo which translates into an in­
creased tax rate of 7%.
Solving for Optimal Levels of X^ and X2
Up to this point, a number of spending alternatives have been exam­
ined, but it was assumed that no change occurred in the state aid for­
mula. This is certainly unrealistic, particularly in the cases where 
large changes in expenditures are required.
The simplest way to allow for increased aid would be to raise ex­
penditure ceiling levels, and C2 , thereby increasing the level of
50
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expenditures per TAPU in which the state would share. However, within 
the context of this programming model, no optimal levels o l a d 2
could he determined because of the non-linearity created by introducing 
and c2 as decision variables (equation 9).
Another way to change the state aid formula is to 8olve
levels of Xl and X2, the state shares of a district of average wealth for 
tier 1 and tier 2 aid, respectively. By setting an upper tax limit of 
S35 per $1 000 full value, the state is forced to adjust aid apportion 
fentPto meet^new expenditure levels of local school districts In this 
section, the effects of solving for state-aid minimizing 1 v 1
X2 on tax rates, total state aid, and state aid per TAPU are examined 
light of alternative expenditure schemes.
In order to analyze the effects of treating and X2 as decision 
variables on state and local expenditures, one musthaveanunderstanding 
of which LP run comparisons make the most sense. Ideal _7. P 
solutions with exactly the same assumptions (except that in one solution 
Xi and Xo are optimal and in the other X]_ and X2 a e
0.80, respectively) would give the best indication of c “ and
school financing system caused by solving for optimal eve 1
X2. These ideal comparisons are impossible to make because solutions for 
all expenditure assumptions except the base run are inf^ aslble if 
X2 are fixed at current levels and tax rate ceiiings are set at $35 p 
J  ooo full value. Comparisons of solutions assuming optimal levels 
I ’and X2 with tax rates limited to $35 per $1,000 full value are, there­
fore, made with solutions assuming Xj. and X2 fixed atnc“ “ ntth1eeV^ ® t^  
tax rate ceilings at $45 per $1,000 full value. _ During, * * £ * £ £
r  S  This implies negative tier 2 aid and is consisten with 
a District Power Equalization strategy. These solutions are discu sed tn 
the next section. The discussion in the remainder of this section
assumes that X2 <0.87; tier 2 aid is restricted to be positive.
The general effect of keeping tier 2 aid positive and tax rates
below $45 per $1,000 full value is aho™  i” table U > “ ifimpUes that in both cases Xo increases to its upper limit, 0.87. inis imp 
the state's share of the tier 2 aid ceiling C2, for a district of ayera*® 
wealth is only 13%, down from the level in the present aid formula of 
2o f  The state.s share of tier 1 aid for the district of average wealth 
is ;iso reduced in LP Runs 8 and 10 from 49% to 46%. Despitethe changes
in these parameters, the implications for stata %ld tD ®/U^ooO of full significant if one allows tax rates to reach $45 p $ . 1
value By comparing LP Runs 8 and 10 with LP Runs 1 and 2, respectively. 
It is' clear that total state aid under the 1980-81 aid formula is less 
than 5% higher than in the case where Xq and X2 are set a op m
levels.
The results change dramatically if one imposes a l i m i t  on property 
tax rates of $35 per $1,000 on school districts and solves tp gun 2
^ d  LP Run iT with LP Vun 4 A  table 11 illustrate this situation. For
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the case where assumed expenditure levels are ad justed only for infla­
tion, the optimal values of XL and X2 fall to 0.37 and 0.0, respectively, 
indicating that the state pays 64% of the tier 1 ceiling level and the 
entire tier 2 ceiling level of $100 to the district of average wealth. 
With total expenditures adjusted for inflation at $7,692 million the 
state pays 44% or $1,096 per TAPU, on average. This is 24% above the 
$883 per TAPU paid by the state when X: = 0.51 and X2 = 0.80. Similar, 
but less dramatic, patterns are noticed even when these inflated exoendi- 
tures are equalized at $2,336 per TAPU. Optimal levels of Xt and X2 fall 
to 0.49 and 0.0, respectively. The state pays 51% of the tier 1 ceiling 
to the district of average wealth while all districts eligible for tier 2 
aid receive a "flat grant" of $100 per TAPU, the tier 2 ceiling level. 
The share of total expenditures paid by the state is increased to 41% 
from 38% under the current aid formula.
A more detailed account of the effects of treating Xx and X2 as 
decision variables is given in table 15. By keeping expenditure levels 
constant and comparing LP Run 2 with LP Run 9 the effects of solving for 
optimal levels of X^ and X2 on state aid and tax rates are isolated.
Richer districts, excluding flat grant districts, receive a greater 
relative increase in state aid compared to poorer ones. For example, 
state aid is increased by 49% and 66% in groups 4 and 5, respectively, 
while in groups 1 and 2 there are increases of approximately 10% and 17%, 
respectively. This pattern also exists in the large urban areas with the 
largest increases in aid occurring in Yonkers (68.1%) and Albany 
(59.6%). Had they not been treated separately, these two districts would 
be grouped in wealth group 5.
An interesting comparison of the state's shares can be made by exam­
ining groups with the largest and smallest relative changes in state aid 
under the modified aid system. The increase in state aid to Yonkers in 
LP^ Run 9 causes the state's share of total expenditures to increase to 
25%. This is 10 percentage points above the state's share under identi­
cal expenditures but using the 1980-81 aid formula, and 8 percentage 
points above the base run. The state's share in group 1, however, in­
creased to 77%, 7 percentage points over the share apportioned under the 
1980-81 aid formula, but one percentage point below the base run. Under 
the modified aid formula, increased expenditures are compensated almost 
identically in the poorer group from a state's share perspective, while 
in the richer Yonkers, the new formula overcompensates for increased ex­
penditure levels.
Relative tax rate reductions are greatest in poorer groups. Group 1 
tax rates are reduced by 22%, while group 5 tax rates decrease by only 
17%. A simple ratio of relative increases in state aid to relative re­
ductions in tax rates roughly indicates the effect of a one percent in­
crease in state aid on tax rates. In group 1, a one percent increase in 
state aid reduces tax rates by 2.3%. However, in group 5, the same per­
centage increase in state aid reduces tax rates by only 0.3%. This 
implies that state aid is much more effective in reducing tax rates at 
the lower end of the wealth scale.
By comparing LP Run 11, which assumes equalized expenditures, to LP 
Run 2, it is clear that an equalized expenditure scheme requires a
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tremendous increase 1- «  e«ort ^ w e a l t h  ^ J psT n -
under optimal levels of Xx and 2 C rates to spend at the
eluding the large urban areas have toredu lncludeB the six wealth
equalized level. The rest of the state w n i c n x
groups has to increase tax rates, on average, by 2j a.
An aid allocation scheme in which X], atld ^2 are to all
11 when compared with LP Run 4 provides some gtat. ald (tabie
wealth groups. This is, o ’ higher in wealth groups 3, 4
16). Relative increases in state aid a h^ 8 Qus sltuatlon, tax
and 5 than in groups 1 and 2. However, F
rate decreases are greatest in groups 1 and Z.
From a taxPayer's £ r o m
r elSse°f nX\aaxndra^;. TheSSexperience the largest percentage decrease m  tax rates
Adjusting equalized expend:Ltures^
among districts in an optim 1 2bl 16). Specifically, groups 1
all non-urban area wealth group ( ^  ^  and 16%> respectively,
through 4 experience reductions f 28/{, •> ?% and 3%> respective-
while in groups 5 and 6, the reductions y ^  ^  Run 12 a3 in LP
ly. Because state aid remains re a ly reduced expenditures
Run U, these tax rate reductions are tne resuj.u
and not from reapportioning aid.
j „.0iv pffp cted when expenditures are All of the urban areas are adversely aftecte are lncreased
adjusted for ^ L P  Runs^lT'and8^  "Vcause these districts face higher 
Toft indices^than the rest of the state, on average they have to in­
crease tax efforts to compensate for the increased co
Solving for optimal levels of Xi and X2 under ‘^ T e v e ^  £  fnl 
par $1.000 : Hroups is in a manner 
S '  W h r r" h e 0r districts receive greater relative
However, poorer districts are ®b^itional^dollars spent on state aid are
^  effectively8 spent^fro^a t t ^  p^ecti/e, poorer districts.
Because tier 2 aid is construed
in levels o f  Xi and X2 are ^  ^ ^ e g a t i v e ,  a change in the
However, if tier 2 aid is a n  ld is apportioned through the
basic structure £akes plaC ‘ l8 taken away because of negative tier 2 
tier 1 aid formula and then is ta e y describes the district
aid, total aid remains positive. This situation a 
power equalization (DPE) implemented in Wisconsin.
Analysis of District Power Equalization (DPE)
In a pure district power equalization framework school
in effect, face the same tax base per pupil* Property
districts, 
wealth is
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neutralized; equal tax rates among districts will raise equal revenues. 
This is achieved by "taxing" away additional revenues raised by districts 
with access to more resources and apportioning these funds to poorer 
school districts. However, negative aid for any school district is 
politically as well as legally (in Wisconsin, for example) infeasible.
Total aid cannot be negative. However, in a two-tier aid system, 
aid can be apportioned through tier 1 aid and "taxed" away through tier 2 
aid in such a way that total aid remains positive. Wisconsin currently 
implements this type of aid scheme.
In order to apply DPE to all districts in New York State, each dis^ - 
trict must receive both tiers of aid. A respecification of equations 
(11) and (13), the state aid constraints for tier 1 only and flat grant 
districts, is required to include tier 1 and tier 2 aid for these dis­
tricts. Without respecifying the model, however, a preliminary examina­
tion of DPE can be achieved by analyzing only those districts already 
receiving tier 1 and tier 2 aid.
Tier 1 and tier 2 aid applies only to wealth groups 1 through 4, 
Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse and the Bronx and Brooklyn combined as New 
York City. Analysis of DPE, therefore, applies to only these districts 
in the model. Two expenditure assumptions are used: 1979-f80 AOE ad­
justed for inflation and 1979-80 average AOE adjusted for inflation. The 
assumptions in the LP Runs used for analysis of DPE are given in table 
17. In LP Runs 14 and 15, tier 2 aid becomes negative*
The largest state shares of expenditures in a DPE aid scheme under 
both expenditure assumptions occur in solutions which constrain tax rates 
to be less than $35 per $1,000. The state pays, on average, $1,267 per 
TAPU or 62.1% of Inflated expenditure levels (LP Run 9-A). This is about 
22% above state expenditure under the current aid formula. If districts 
spend at the state average (LP Run 4~A) state aid becomes 48.9% of the 
total. The state pays 8% more than what is apportioned in the current 
formula. Larger state shares in these runs are reflected in optimal 
levels of Xi and X2 » In both runs, X2 = 0.0 which apportions $100 per 
TAPU to all districts eligible for tier 2 aid. In the current formula X2 
= 0.8, which distributes only $20 per TAPU to the district of average 
wealth. The stateTs share of tier 1 aid for the district of average 
wealth in LP runs 9-A and 4-A at 63% and 51%, respectively, is also 
greater compared to the current state share at 49%.
In a minimization of state aid scheme, the state takes full advan­
tage of being allowed to apportion negative tier 2 aid. For example, X2 
= 1.74 in LP Run 14 and X2 =“ 3.05 in LP Run 15 which determined guaran­
teed valuation levels at $49,927 per RTAPU and $22,778, respectively.^5 
These levels are very low compared to the guaranteed valuation levels in 
tier 1 aid implied by X^ = 0.70: $99,247 per RTAPU in both LP Runs 14
^5Recall that guaranteed valuation levels calculated by dividing the 
state average full value per RTAPU by X^ and X2 «
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and 15. The result is that the state shares in a small part of total ex­
penditures relative to other solutions. In LP run 15, for example, the 
state expenditures are $617 per TAPU, a decrease of 41% from the current 
aid formula. In LP Run 14, the decrease is 19.0%, to a level of $845 per 
TAPU.
The effect of negative tier 2 aid is reflected in tax rates. An in­
crease in average tax rates by about 20%, to a level of $23-66 per $1,000 
full value, is required to make up for reduced state aid in LP Run 14, 
In LP Run 15, a tax rate of $34.04 per $1,000 full value is required in 
order to adjust for the aid losses, and the equalized expenditure levels.
The effects of changes in state aid on tax rates by wealth groups is 
illustrated in table 18. If a $35 per $1,000 full value tax rate is 
used, as in LP Run 9—A, all wealth groups receive increases in state 
aid. The largest increases occur in the wealthier districts; group 4 
realizes a 49% increase while group 1 receives only a 10% increase. Tax 
rate reductions are slightly higher in wealth group 1 than in wealth 
group 4, consistent with the results found previously.
When tier 2 aid is unconstrained and becomes negative under $45 per 
$1,000 tax rate assumptions, all wealth groups receive reductions in aid 
compared with current levels. Consequently, all tax rates are in­
creased. The largest reduction in aid occurs in group 4, a decrease of 
62%. The lowest, in group 1, is a 12% reduction. In urban areas, reduc­
tions in aid range from about 18% in New York City to about 49% in 
Rochester.
State shares of total expenditures are reduced considerably in run 
14 with negative tier 2 aid as compared to the current aid formula in Run 
2“A. In wealth group 4, a reduction of aid by 61% reduces the state 
share of total expenditures from 31% to 12%. In group 1, a 12% reduction 
in aid reduces the state share from 70% to 62% of total expenditures.
Tax rates Increase the most in wealth groups 2 and 3 by 42% and 41%,
respectively. A clearer view of effects of negative tier 2 aid on tax 
rates is provided by calculating ratios of percent changes in tax rates 
to percent changes in state aid. A one percent decrease in state aid 
causes the greatest change in tax in group 1, an increase by 2,37%. In 
group 4, howevery a one percent decrease in aid Increases tax rates by 
0.46%.
Similar patterns in state aid and tax rates occur under a DPE aid 
scheme when expenditures are equalized as in LP Runs 4-A and 15 (table 
19). State aid for all districts is increased in Run 4-A, the solution 
assuming a $35 per $1,000 tax rate ceiling. Tax rates, however, increase 
the most in the poorer groups, while in group 4 an actual reduction in 
tax rates is realized. This is due to the equalization of expenditures 
which force poorer districts to increase spending substantially, and 
richer districts to reduce spending.
In LP Run 15, with a $45 per $1,000 tax rate ceiling, state aid is 
reduced in all wealth groups. The largest reductions occur in group 4,
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decreasing by 92%, while group 1 reduces aid by 18% under tl^ e current 
levels*. Tax rate increases are greatest in the poorest group with a 121% 
increase, and show relative decreases moving up the wealth scale to group 
4 which shows a 48% reduction. This pattern of tax rate ^creases is 
caused mainly by the change in expenditure levels from 1979-80 AOE levels 
adjusted for inflation, to the average 1979-80 AOE levels adjusted fo 
inflation.
Under district power equalisation, poorer wealth groups still re­
quire huge increases in tax effort in order to reach the equalized lev­
el. Assuming tax rates no greater than $35 per $1,000 full value, which 
allows for more state aid in the final solution, a 70% increase is re­
quired for the poorest wealth group to spend $2,336 per pupil. I t  tax 
rate bounds are increased to $45 per $1,000, state aid is removed from 
the solution and tremendous increases in tax rates are required at the 
lower end of the district wealth scale.
Changing state aid formulas marginally, or a bit more drastically by 
not forcing tier 2 aid to be positive, affects school finance partici­
pants in conjunction with other assumptions made concerning tax rates an 
expenditure levels. For example, none of the changes in the aid formula 
examined could provide much tax relief to poor districts spending at an 
average inflated level of $ 2,336. Tax rate assumptions are found to be 
crucial in determining the amount of state aid allowed into the solution, 
a $35 per $1,000 full value tax limit increases state aid while a $40 per 
$1,000 limit increases local expenditures. Although a large nma er o 
comparisons between solutions under alternative assumptions can be made, 
the analysis above has provided some interesting insights into the struc­
ture and working parts of the New York State school financing system. In 
the next section, a summary of these insights is provided.
Summary and Policy Implications
Throughout the 1970's, financing public education had increasingly 
come under fire. Across the United States, local administrators and par­
ents of school children have protested inequities in educational opportu­
nity by articulating their arguments in court. In New York State, t s 
nrnfpst is in the form of Levittown v. Nyquist, m  which the plaintiffs 
argued that the current method of financing elementary and secondary edu 
cation violates two separate but related Articles of the State Constitu^ 
tion. Because some school districts have access to more educational re 
sources than others, poorer districts are compelled to offer an inferior 
education to students. This, the plaintiffs allege, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the State Constitution. In the second cause for ac­
tion, the plaintiffs allege a violation of the Education Article of the 
State Constitution, because the quality of the child’s education depends 
on the real property wealth in the district in which a child happens to 
reside. The judgement in favor of the plaintiffs was issued June 23, 
1978. Although recently reversed under appeal, court cases such as 
Levittown v . Nyquist have brought issues of educational qua ty an op 
portunity among school districts to the foreground.
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The purpose of this study is to examine the current inequities in 
the school financing system in New York State and to develop a linear 
programming model to examine systematically changes in expenditure lev­
els, tax rates and state aid policy parameters designed to promote equal 
educational opportunity. Because a major overhaul of the system would 
most likely be politically unacceptable, the modifications examined in 
this study are within the existing framework. Implications of alterna­
tive school district expenditure levels combined with modifications in 
the aid formula for local taxpayers and for the state budget are empha­
sized. In this section, summaries of the major changes In the New York 
State aid formulas throughout the 70's, the linear programming model used 
in the analysis, expenditure assumptions, and the results and policy im­
plications are provided.
Summary
In section 2, major changes in New York State aid formula are traced 
through the 1970's. Inequities in terms of expenditures per pupil and 
taxpayer effort existing in New York were not removed even after several 
modifications in the aid formula were implemented. For example, an aid 
ratio type formula was used to distribute aid in 1970-71. The state set 
the percentage of the ceiling level ($860 per Weighted Average Daily 
Attendance in 1970—71) that will be paid to a district of average wealth 
(49% in 1971). School district wealth is compared to the state average 
and aid is generated in an inverse proportion to the district's wealth. 
Poorer districts received more than 49% of the ceiling, districts of 
average wealth receive 49% of the expenditure celling and districts with 
above average wealth received less than 49% of the ceiling level.
A foundation type aid formula including a new pupil measure was 
implemented in 1974-75. The state paid the difference between an expen­
diture level ceiling and a $15 per $1,000 full value of property tax rate 
applied to the school district's wealth in a foundation type aid for­
mula. Districts received aid inversely proportional to property wealth. 
A new pupil measure, including additional weightings for handicapped and 
disadvantaged students, was designed to be a more precise measure of spe­
cific district needs.
A return to the use of aid ratios to apportion aid occurred in 1978- 
79. An additional expenditure celling was added for relatively poorer 
districts. This second tier of aid was designed to apportion additional 
aid to poorer school districts. The two-tier system is currently Imple­
mented in New York State.
Because of the linearity existing among variables in the present aid 
formula, New York State's financing scheme can be modeled in a linear 
programming framework. The LP approach allows one to examine the trade­
off between the size of the state budget and taxpayer efforts while opti­
mizing a policy goal. Comparisons of tax efforts among alternative ex­
penditure assumptions are facilitated by this framework. In this study, 
state aid is minimized subject to some basic constraints.
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In general^ there are three types of constraints required to model 
the relationships among variables in the school finance system* First, 
state aid constraints are used to apportion aid to school districts. 
Each district receives tier 1 and tier 2, only tier 1, or flat grant aid 
depending on the wealth of the district- One constraint for each dis­
trict is needed to apportion the appropriate type of aid- Second, expen­
diture constraints place lower bounds on expenditure levels for each dis­
trict . These bounds are designed to reflect: a) 1979—80 levels, b) 
these levels adjusted for general inflation to project 1980-81 expendi­
tures; c) levels adjusted for cost differentials among school districts, 
d) expenditure levels set at the State average and e) levels which level- 
up expenditures to the 65th percentile of district groups when ranked 
from low to high expenditures« Finally, tax rates are constrained by 
upper bounds which represent an upper limit above which is considered 
politically or legally unacceptable. Two tax rate ceilings are assumed 
in the model. Other accounting constraints are used to sum total state 
aid and total local expenditures.
The aid formula is modified by treating the state shares of the two 
expenditure ceilings for the district of average wealth as decision vari­
ables. Three assumptions are made concerning average state shares: 
average state shares are fixed at the same levels as in the current for­
mula; average state shares are variable but tier 2 aid is restricted pos­
itive; and average state shares are variable but tier 2 aid is not 
restricted. The third assumption represents a preliminary analysis of 
District Power Equalization, in which aid is distributed through tier 1 
but can be "taxed" away by negative tier 2 aid.
Because there are more than 700 school districts in New York, dis­
tricts with similar characteristics are aggregated to make the model more 
manageable. Districts are grouped by six pupil ranges, six wealth per 
pupil ranges and three approved operating expense per pupil ranges. The 
large urban areas, New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Yonkers 
and Albany are treated separately. Results are reported by wealth group 
aggregates, group 1 being the poorest and group 6 the richest, and by 
urban areas.
Different solutions to the programming model are obtained as expen­
diture assumptions, tax rate assumptions, and assumptions concerning 
average state shares are changed. Other variables solved by the model 
include state aid per pupil, local expenditures per pupil, tax rates, 
total state aid and total local spending. Appropriate comparisons are 
made in order to translate alternative expenditure assumptions into state 
and local financing decisions.
A solution for the "base" case is determined to serve as a starting 
point for comparisons. In the "base" run, districts spend at 1979-80 
approved operating expenditure levels, totaling $6.9 billion, and aid is 
distributed through the current aid formula. The state pays 47% of the 
expenditure level, which is very close to the tier 1 state share of 49% 
for the district of average wealth. State aid accounts for 78% of expen­
ditures in the poorest wealth group compared to 17% in Yonkers, a rich 
district. This would suggest that the aid formula is providing a much 
larger share of expenditures to poorer districts. However, it must
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be remembered that the state shares only In the first $1,700 of expendi­
tures . Because richer districts tend to spend more per pupil the state’s 
larger share in poorer districts results from lower expenditure levels in 
addition to the aid formula.
Tax rates tend to increase as operating expenditures increase, but 
the correlation coefficient between expenditures and tax rates across the 
six city schools and the six wealth groups is only 0.3. This can be ex­
plained by examining the'two wealthiest groups which tax at a relatively 
low rate, partially due to the flat grant provision providing aid to dis­
tricts irrespective of property wealth.
Only 6% of the state’s aidable pupil units are affected by the flat 
grant provision. If removed, local districts would need a 16% increase 
in local contributions, but tax rates would still remain below those of 
the school districts in the next two wealthiest groups. Total aid is re­
duced by less than 5 percent, a relatively small impact on state aid. 
Reductions in the flat grant provision are currently under study by the 
Legislature.
Approved operating expenses in 1979-80 are increased by 11% to ana­
lyze the impact of general inflation on school districts. Ratios of the 
relative changes in tax rates to relative changes in expenditures for 
wealth groups indicate the effects of a one percent increase in expendi­
tures. The poorest wealth group where the ratio is 4.6 is nearly double 
the average of 2.4. The two richest groups require a smaller increase in 
tax rates to finance a one percent increase in expenditure. Both ratios 
in these groups ate less than 1.3. This analysis suggests that poorer 
districts are affected the most when expenses rise by some percentage. 
Updating the state aid formula (the ceilings on which aid is applicable) 
annually is more critical for the poorer districts than for the richer 
ones.
Urban areas argue that because there is more competition for prop­
erty tax revenues for other public services, and educational resource 
costs are generally higher, an educational overburden exists in these 
non-rural districts. Accordingly, they maintain the existing state aid 
formulas, which use wealth per RTAPU as a base for distributing aid, 
overstates city school districts’ fiscal capacity to finance schools. 
Adjusting expenditures for cost differentials among districts with the 
aid of a cost index allows one to examine one aspect of this overburden 
argument. Total expenditures for the state increase by 1 percent, indi­
cating that there are more high cost districts than low cost ones. If 
the state were to encourage districts to remove some of the disparities 
in educational opportunity by adjusting expenditures by the cost of re­
source index, some wealth groups are significantly affected. The lowest 
wealth group would reduce expenditures by an amount equal to 11%. Dis­
tricts in all other wealth groups would, on average, have to reduce ex­
penditures . However, the major urban areas would require an increase in 
expenditures to compensate for higher relative costs. The largest in­
crease, 22% occurs in Albany compared to a 13% increase required in 
Rochester.
While the Fleischmann Commission concluded that equalizing expendi­
tures among school districts would be one step toward providing equal
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educational opportunity, they realized the j„C this light,
quiring the richer districts to « d“ “ ! !  .11 districts
they proposed an expenditure scheme t^ dl8trlcts by spend­
spending below the 65th percent * * *’ endln| above the 65th per-
Both of these alternatives are examined in this.study. 
spending levels at the state average, adjusted for i^fl ^
penditures would ln=r®a®® by x are required to reduce spending,
richer districts under this biilion, 6% below the projected
expenditures statewide would total $ 7 * l b l L  *, for inflation). Lev- 
1980-81 level (e.g. base expenditures ad^sted y  f ^  i g %  0'ver the
ellng-up expenditures ^ricreases total sp^ ^  Jdju8ted £or inflation.
base case and more than da aD v •» -durational oppor-
Both of these ^“ ^egies for muring <£*£ “ not become ridiculously
tunity are feasible* that is* torax y ° rhe exlsting aid formu-
las^ei;heHpoorer'districts ^ re Effected Significantly by proposed expend!- 
ture levels.
Under the current formula the
quire 79% and 67% increases in ax ' , 007 reduction in the
spend at the equalized levels; this co-par«  • 96% in-
wealthiest group. poorest groups,* while the richest group
CredSeoiv aai4r4/einfrease. Unless additional aid is apportioned to the 
p ^ r “wealth1 g’rolps, it is unlikely that any leveling-up or equalizing
expenditure schemes will be implemented.
The spending aUernatives summarized »  far have f£  ^
formula to m^nlmiz^ aid subject to s t ^ s h a ^ s l n
aid formula is modified by^olving^r and tax rate
expenditure ceilings f  nrnr,pT-tv are imposed on all dis—
ceilings of $35 per $1,000 fu va ue rhrouah a modified version of
tricts, additional state aid sappor ^  state aid are examined by
« “ t ^ : . t  the modified version under the same
expenditure levels.
Assuming that school districts spend the projected 1980-8! levels,
and a $35 tax limit, state aid *!■•■ £ “  f o u n d e r  the old aid for­
spending, when compared to levels of average state
mula and no constraint on tax -nt-ire tier 2 expenditureshares require the state to distribute the entire tie^ ^
ceiling level to eligible districts. Bee . ^ J ied formula” to ap-
eligible for tier 2 aid, one mig t . However, these districts
portion relatively more aid to t ese . \ revenues from the state
were already receiving a ^  ^ ^ T h e  richer districts.
W^lttgr1:;8:3: « X ^  66%y increases in aid, respectively,
compared to a 10% increase for wealth group 1.
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By solving for optimal state shares of the ceiling levels, one is 
also able to examine the effectiveness of state aid in reducing tax 
rates* In general, state aid is more effective in reducing tax rates in 
poorer districts than in richer ones* In the poorest wealth group, for 
example, a one percent increase in state aid reduces tax rates by 2.3%. 
In wealth group 5, the same percentage increase in state aid reduces tax 
rates by only 0*3%. Thus, it is not surprising that poorer districts 
attempting to spend at equalized levels, require large tax rate increases 
under the modified aid formula. For example, wealth groups 1 and 2 must
LT ^ Se „taX rateS by 70% and 57Z* respectively, even after receiving 
a ditional aid. The modified formula does not offer much tax relief to 
these districts.
The other modification in the state aid formula examined in this 
study was the application of District Power Equalization (DPE) to those 
districts currently receiving tier 1 and tier 2 aid. In its purest form, 
PE would allow for the same level of expenditure by all districts at a 
given tax rate regardless of the district's wealth. This implies that 
all districts are spending at the same level and that revenues raised 
through this common tax rate in wealthy districts are actually redistrib­
uted to poorer districts. In this particular analysis, however, DPE is 
appiied only to the first $1,700 of expenditures. Thus, it is not a pure 
PE scheme» In addition, the redistribution of revenues from rich to 
poor districts is accomplished by letting tier 2 aid become negative in a 
fashion similar to that implemented in Wisconsin. Total aid to any dis­
trict must remain non—negative.
Those districts receiving tier 1 and tier 2 aid account for 75% of 
the TAPU in the state. Total spending by these districts at the 1979-80 
levels adjusted for inflation are equal to $47 billion. For this same 
spending level, DPE, with no allowance for the effective transfer of rev­
enues from one district to another, state aid increases to 62% of the 
total because of the $35 tax rate. This is essentially the analogous 
situation to solving for optimal levels of state shares discussed above. 
By allowing for negative tier 2 aid this situation is changed dramatical­
ly in that the state share now drops to 41% as compared to 51% under the 
existing aid formula. The largest reduction In aid is a 61% decrease in 
wealth group 4, the wealthiest group in the DPE analysis. The smallest 
reduction is 12%, occurring In wealth group 1. If the state were to re­
duce aid within a DPE scheme, the poorer districts would receive the 
smallest relative decrease.
Reducing state aid has a greater effect on poorer districts in terms 
of tax rates. A one percent reduction in aid to group 1 increases tax 
rates by z.3%* However, a one percent decrease in aid to group 4 re­
quires only a 0.5% increase in rates. Reducing aid within a DPE scheme 
forces poorer districts to increase tax rates significantly compared to 
richer districts in order to spend at previous Xeveis©
Not surprisingly, even under the DPE scheme, districts attempting to 
spend at the state average adjusted for inflation require huge increases 
in t a x efforts. Group 1 for example, requires a 121% increase and group 
4 needs a 94% rise in tax rates in order to finance the new expenditure 
levels, combined with reductions in aid.
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Because of the inherent inequities in educational resources across 
the state, the use of this particular DPE scheme to apportion aid does 
not appear, in a preliminary analysis, to he much different than the cur­
rent or modified aid formulas. The relationships existing among richer 
and poorer districts under the current and modified formulas, are still 
visible under the DPE scheme. The situation would be quite different if 
DPE were implemented in its "purest" form in conjunction with modified 
(or equalized) expenditure levels. These changes, however, would mark a 
significant departure from the status quo.
Policy Implications
In light of the fact that many state school financing schemes have 
been challenged in the courts in terms of equal educational opportunity, 
any move toward a more equitible system in New York State will depend 
largely on how educational opportunity is defined. In this study three 
possible interpretations are examined: equal spending at the state aver­
age; equal spending at the state average adjusted for cost differentials; 
and a minimum expenditure level set at expenditures leveled-up to the 
65th percentile. Each of these alternatives implies a change from the 
status quo and could possibly meet the guidelines implied in any court 
challenge. Prom a policy perspective each can be evaluated in terms of 
its economic and political feasibility by examining how radical a depar­
ture each implies from the existing situation, for example, if one 
assumes that spending at average levels adjusted for cost differentials, 
the implications for students across the state can be examined by simple 
ratios of the new versus the existing expenditure level. That is, simple 
ratios of the 1979-80 expenditure levels adjusted for inflation and lev­
eled-up expenditures indicated by how much district groups' spending de­
viates from this cost adjusted alternative.
Treating this inflated-expenditure situation as the existing one, it 
is evident that some district groups are currently spending at nearly the 
appropriate levels as determined by this equity criterion. On average, 
in the 6 wealth groups, inflated expenditures are 98% of the more equita­
ble spending levels. The lowest three groups 1, 2 and 3 currently spend 
10%, 12% and 9% below the proposed levels. Although these comparisons 
ignore the intragroup variation among districts, the fact that no group 
is spending less than 88% of the "equitable level" is somewhat encour­
aging. That is, the adjustments required to meet court mandates may be 
less severe than initially anticipated.
The implications for taxpayers around the state are also important. 
For example, an increase in expenditures required for the 6 wealth groups 
to reach the average-cost adjusted levels translates into a 15% increase 
in average tax rates under the current aid formula. Under a modified 
version of the aid formula where formula parameters are set at optimal 
levels, spending at the new levels increases average tax rates by only 8% 
for the six wealth groups. Regardless of how expenditures are increased, 
current aid formulas imply that tax rates in the poorer districts must be 
much larger for every one percent increase in spending than in richer 
districts.
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The fact that these tax rate elasticities with respect to spending 
levels cannot be altered by changing only the rate at which the state 
shares in expenditure level ceilings is a classic situation in which one 
policy tool cannot achieve expenditure and taxpayer equity objectives. 
To meet both objectives, the state would have to allow both the expendi­
ture ceiling levels in which it is willing to share and the state share 
differ by district wealth. The extent to which aid formulas can be tai­
lored to a district’s special circumstances depends on political and le­
gal constraints, as well as economic ones.
From an economist’s point of view ad justing equalized expenditures 
for the differential costs of educational resources is appealing. How­
ever, the courts may argue that such adjustments are unnecessary to meet 
the state’s responsibility, in which case the tax implications for people 
in poorer districts would be compounded because of the relatively high 
correlation between wealth per pupil and cost of educational services.
At the other end of the continuum, the courts or the Legislature 
could obviously interpret equality of educational opportunity in terms of 
meeting some arbitrarily high minimum expenditure level. The leveling-up 
alternative examined in this study is an example of this strategy in 
which minimum but not maximum expenditures are imposed. By examining ex­
penditure levels under this system of leveling-up expenditures to the 
65th percentile with cost adjusted average expenditure, the implications 
for students under this definition of equity are apparent (Appendix F of 
Colburn, 1981).
In all groups, except Albany, increases in expenditures occur. The 
leveling-up process overcompensates for the equalization and cost adjust­
ments in virtually all cases. In the 6 wealth groups, expenditures are 
20% higher on average over the equalized and cost adjusted levels. Large 
tax rate increases are also required to finance the leveled-up expendi­
ture scheme. Extremely large increases in tax rates required by low 
wealth districts make the leveled-up expenditure scheme difficult to im­
plement unless substantial amounts of additional aid is apportioned to 
these districts-
These two situations essentially represent two extremes of a contin­
uum. In the case of adjusting average expenditures for cost differen­
tials, total spending could be kept at existing levels but some districts 
would be required to reduce expenditures per pupil. Because they proba­
bly would not do so willingly, the idea of leveling-up expenditures to 
some minimum level would certainly have political appeal. Although not 
examined specifically in this study, leveling-up expenditures to some 
point less than the 65th percentile could probably be used as a first 
step in meeting the court challenges, while at the same time mitigating 
some of the adverse tax implications for local taxpayers.
In conclusion, the results of the experimentation with the model 
suggest that the minor modifications in the state aid formula analyzed in 
this study are not particularly effective in reducing tax rates to the 
poorer districts. This is due to the fact that these minor modifications 
effectively allocated more state aid to districts of moderate wealth.
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opportunity 'unless0 a V ^ L K c . n t  modification in the aid formula is de-
signed simultaneously.
Because of these competing objectives, it is extremely di«i£lt: to
model provides a useful framework in which to examine a wi e rang
ternatives, while at the same ^
examined "within the* context of minimizing state aid ^
tax rates. However, other strategies might be to look at minimizing tax 
raLs subject to expenditure and state aid constraints or to^maximum
total expenditures subject to tax rate and aid addl_
the allowable variation in expenditures across districts. These aoo 
tional experiments, along with programming strategies for varyi g 
r f a t i T a n d  ceiiings by district wealth are 
ditional research. They should be coordinated with the ®ta^ ® 8 
In reexamining real property as the only
ing flat grant and save-harmless provisions in the aid formulas
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APPENDIX A
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SCHOOL DISTRICT GROUPS IN THE LP MODEL
Total Full Value/ Alternative Expenditure Levels/TAPU Index of
Group
Gijk
Aidable
Pupil
Units
Resident
Total
Aidable
Pupil
Units
1980-81
Approved Inflated 
Operating
Inflated
and Cost 
Adjusted
Equalized
and Cost 
Adjusted
Cost of 
Educa­
tional 
Resources
G112 3*748 $ 27,611 $1,476
G113 22,184 28,724 1,486
G114 10,355 27,012 1,565
Gil 5 5,225 30,367 1,514
G121 2,291 41,988 1,472
G122 18,365 43,486 1,468
G123 61,380 42,004 1,501
G124 30,466 42,920 1,546
G125 14,940 41,293 1,552
G131 924 64,330 1,460
G132 4,043 59,868 1,475
G133 8,895 55,318 1,438
G134 5,981 60,934 1,438
0135 7,445 53,211 1,475
G141 678 72,620 1,504
G142 3,094 77,175 1,504
G153 1,532 98,220 1,590
G161 496 130,374 1,548
G162 760 126,440 1,496
G165 5,216 161,913 1,545
G211 625 26,717 1,658
G212 2,884 32,939 1,647
G213 13,243 30,175 1,638
G214 9,478 29,730 1,648
G221 1,096 42,175 1,654
G222 7,672 47,164 1,639
G223 40,400 41,389 1,643
G224 38,105 41,438 1,652
G225 23,015 45,927 1,682
G226 14,199 50,168 1,661
G231 381 52,469 1,625
G232 2,699 60,606 1,665
G233 7,313 54,961 1,644
G234 13,872 58,971 1,672
G235 13,317 56,258 1,613
G243 3,602 76,374 1,642
G244 5,925 79,107 1,661
G311 413 29,821 1,909
G312 4,198 27,243 1,849
G313 18,183 28,038 1,820
G314 5,806 27,353 2,180
$1,642 $1,438 $2,047 0.8764
1,654 1,496 2,114 0.9048
1,741 1,613 2,164 0.9265
1,684 1,583 2,196 0.9400
1,638 1,418 2,023 0.8661
1,633 1,458 2,085 0.8925
1,670 1,536 2,148 0.9196
1,719 1,613 2,192 0.9381
1,727 1,658 2,243 0.9600
1,624 1,406 2,022 0.8655
1,641 1,447 2,060 0.8817
1,600 1,500 2,192 0.9381
1,600 1,455 2,124 0.9094
1,641 1,690 2,406 1.0300
1,674 1,465 2,044 0.8751
1,673 1,500 2,094 0.8962
1,769 1,610 2,126 0.9100
1,722 1,466 1,989 0.8513
1,665 1,665 2,336 1.0000
1,719 1,719 2,266 0.9700
1,845 1,653 2,093 0.8960
1,832 1,590 2,028 0.8680
1,822 1,648 2,114 0.9047
1,834 1,686 2,148 0.9194
1,840 1,601 2,032 0.8700
1,823 1,628 2,086 0.8929
1,828 1,688 2,157 0.9232
1,838 1,751 2,227 0.9531
1,871 1,845 2,303 0.9860
1,848 1,848 2,336 1.0000
1,807 1,572 2,032 0.8700
1,852 1,689 2,131 0.9122
1,829 1,737 2,220 0.9501
1,860 1,744 2,191 0.9378
1,794 1,723 2,243 0.9603
1,827 1,659 2,121 0.9081
1,848 1,720 2,174 0.9307
2,124 1,805 1,986 0.8500
2,057 1,826 2,074 0.8876
2,024 1,836 2,119 0.9071
2,425 2,231 2,149 0.9200
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Total
Full
Value/ Alternative Expenditure Levels/TAPU Index ofGroup Aidable Resident; 1980-81 Inflated Equalized Cost of
G. -L. Pupil Total Approved In- and Cost and Cost Educa-
Units Aidable Operating flated Adjusted Adjusted tional
Pupil
Units
Resources
G322 6,801 $ 39,882 $1,848 $2,056 $1,849 $2,101 0.8992G323 84,090 41,828 1,817 2,021 1,853 2,142 0.9170G324 143,506 44,561 1,959 2,180 2,120 2,272 0.9726G325 117,589 43,872 2,161 2,404 2,460 2,390 1.0231G326 148,867 43,701 2,154 2,397 2,438 2,376 1.0172G331 1,890 59,694 2,105 2,342 2,046 2,041 0.8737G332 5,091 63,025 1,938 2,157 1,937 2,099 0.8983G333 53,149 58,891 2,074 2,307 2,221 2,249 0.9626G334 101,908 59,967 2,213 2,462 2,435 2,311 0.9891G335 191,050 61,063 2,310 2,570 2,571 2,337 1.0005G336 135,882 61,321 2,397 2,667 2,745 2,405 1.0294G341 1,470 77,346 2,061 2,293 2,052 2,091 0.8950G342 9,544 75,237 2,080 2,314 2,120 2,140 0.9160G343 33,008 77,564 2,367 2,634 2,542 2,262 0.9653G344 60,344 78,443 2,478 2,757 2,765 2,343 1.0030G345 103,881 77,382 2,503 2,784 2,856 2,396 1.0256G346 25,960 79,706 2,376 2,644 2,640 2,333 0.9985G351 1,967 98,141 2,096 2,331 2,067 2,071 0.8865G352 2,218 94,983 2,065 2,797 2,065 2,100 0.8988G353 31,627 94,082 2,428 2,701 2,584 2,235 0.9567G354 58,343 95,772 2,787 3,101 3,147 2,370 1.0147
G355 43,877 99,956 2,787 3,100 3,267 2,462 1.0537G356 14,306 87,191 2,074 2,307 2,307 2,336 1.0000G361 6,221 266,778 3,168 3,524 3,170 2,102 0.8997G362 9,862 159,981 2,484 2,763 2,579 2,180 0.9333G363 43,727 149,477 3,099 3,448 3,458 2,343 1.0029G364 73,228 141,604 3,302 3,673 3,797 2,415 1.0337G365 43,450 131,370 3,628 4,036 4,271 2,472 1.0582BUFFALO 50,086 52,427 2,201 2,448 2,522 2,406 1.0300
SYRACUSE 23,094 62,559 2,261 2,516 2,566 2,383 1.0200ROCHESTER 36,979 69,975 2,621 2,916 2,974 2,383 1.0200YONKERS 23,586 96,570 2,791 3,104 3,291 2,476 1.0600ALBANY 9,626 93,167 2,235 2,486 2,735 2,570 1.1000MANHATIEN 146,948 170,508 2,318 2,579 2,707 2,453 1.0500QUEENS,
RICHMOND' 283,033 96,654 2,289 2,546 2,673 2,453 1.0500BRONX 087,822 46,412 2,282 2,538 2,601 2,453 1.0500BROOKLYN 335,251 31,777 2,271 2,527 2,653 2,453 1.0500
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